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INTRODUCTION

The lease royalty clause in an oil and gas lease establishes the
obligation of the lessee to pay royalties to the lessor.' In practice,
1. See 3 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 641
(1995) (discussing role of royalty clause in establishing royalty obligations); see also JOHN
S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW INA NUTSHELL 269 (3d ed. 1995) (designating royalty clause
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however, the royalty clause generally fails to include the details
necessary to calculate the lessor's royalty, 2 primarily because mar-

keting needs cannot fully be determined until actual production begins.3 This shortcoming has long hindered the practical application

and judicial interpretation of royalty clauses. In fact, approximately fifty years ago, one writer recognized royalty clauses as "the
most ambiguous and incomplete provisions of an oil and gas lease
ever to be brought before the courts." 4 Yet, despite this early recognition, the royalty clause in the typical oil and 5gas lease has remained virtually unchanged through the decades.
as "the main provision in an oil and gas lease for compensation for the lessor"). The obligation is established both by the express terms of the royalty clause and by covenants
implied in the lease, particularly the implied covenant of marketing. See Amoco Prod. Co.
v. First Baptist Church of Pyote, 579 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979) (recognizing that lessee has implied covenant to act in "good faith" when selling gas of its
royalty owners), writ refd per curiam n.r.e., 611 S.W.2d 610 (1980); MAURICE H. MERRILL,
COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 84 (2d ed. 1940) (emphasizing that "[t]he
concept of diligence in marketing should include the duty to realize the highest price obtainable by the exercise of reasonable efforts.").
2. For instance, a standard royalty clause reads:
The royalties to be paid by lessee are as follows: On oil, one-eighth of that produced
and saved from said land, the same to be delivered at the wells or to the credit of
Lessor into the pipe line to which the wells may be connected. Lessee shall have the
option to purchase any royalty oil in its possession, paying the market price therefor
prevailing for the field where produced on the date of purchase. On gas, including
casinghead gas, condensate or other gaseous substances, produced from said land and
sold or used off the premises or for the extraction of gasoline or other products therefrom, the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used, provided
that on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount realized
from such sale.
AAPL Form 675 Oil and Gas Lease, inEUGENE 0. KUNTZ ET AL., FORMS MANUAL TO
ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL & GAS LAW 12 (2d ed. 1993); see RICHARD

W.

HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS

§ 7.1, at 359-60 n.6 (3d ed. 1991) (providing

example of comprehensive royalty clause).
3. This inability to accurately anticipate marketing needs is an issue particularly when
the lease permits the lessee to calculate royalty based on the "amount realized" from the
future sale of the oil and gas. In such cases, the lessee obviously will not know the details
of that future sales contract until it is actually negotiated. Those contract terms, therefore,
will depend upon the quality of the oil and gas, which can only be ascertained once production begins. For example, if the gas is "sour," it is generally transported and treated before
it is sold.
4. Joseph T. Sneed, Comment, Value of Lessor's Share of Production Where Gas Only
Is Produced,25 TEX. L. REV. 641,656-57 (1947). The student author of this article, Joseph
T. Sneed, now serves as the Senior Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
5. David E. Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 445, 455-56
(1987). Professor Pierce concludes that the persistence of the oil and gas lease form is due
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In addition to the ambiguous wording of the lease royalty clause,
the presence of other interests in the chain of title, including nonparticipating royalty or mineral interests, complicates the lessee's
obligation to calculate and pay royalties. 6 As a rule, once production begins, all interest owners become entitled to their share of
production or the proceeds from the sale of that production.7
to the "form mentality." Id. at 456. Expanding on this theory, Professor Pierce explains
that "[f]orms tend to be self-perpetuating; once they are used the justification for their
continued use is often 'that's the form we've always used-and everyone else uses."' Id. at
456-57.
6. The interpretive problems posed by deeds creating a nonparticipating royalty interest complicate the lessee's royalty payment obligations under the lease. For an example of
this complication, see Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. 1986), in
which the title examiner misinterpreted the royalty.
A nonparticipating royalty interest is an expense-free interest that entitles the owner to
only a share of oil and gas production. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS,
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS

702 (1994). The owner of such an interest has no right

to execute leases, to share in bonuses, or to delay rental payments. Id. In contrast, a
nonparticipating mineral interest is a cost-bearing interest. Id. at 698-99. It entitles the
owner to a share of bonus and delay rentals as well as royalties under existing or future
leases. Id. at 699.
Determining whether a deed conveyed a nonparticipating mineral or royalty interest is a
problem that continually plagues title examiners. See Bruce M. Kramer, Conveying Mineral Interests: Mastering the Problem Areas, 26 TULSA L.J. 175, 177-78 (1990) (recognizing
difficulty in distinguishing between nonparticipating royalty and mineral interests); Richard M. Maxwell, The Mineral-Royalty Distinction and the Expense of Production, 33 TEX.
L. REV. 463, 468 (1955) (reviewing differences between nonparticipating royalty and mineral interests); see also French v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 896 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Tex. 1995)
(interpreting conveyance as creating nonparticipating mineral interest rather than nonparticipating royalty interest).
7. See RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 7.5, at 389-90 (3d ed.
1991) (explaining that "[w]hen production is obtained, the lessee or the purchaser of production must account to the owners of the royalty interests as provided for under the royalty clauses of the lease"). The typical oil royalty clause permits the lessor to take her
share of production in kind. Id. § 7.1, at 360. Practically speaking, however, the lessor
rarely takes her oil in kind, electing instead to have the lessee market the oil. 3 HOWARD
R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 659; see also Wolfe v. Texas Co.,
83 F.2d 425, 430 (10th Cir. 1936) (recognizing that lessee acts as agent in sale to purchaser
when lessor fails to take oil in kind). In contrast, the gas royalty clause typically provides
that the lessor will be credited with a fractional share of the proceeds from the sale of that
production. 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND
GAS § 6.5, at 289 (1996). Such a lease arrangement results in the gas purchaser contracting
only with the working interest owners, whereas the oil purchaser enters into an agreement
with the royalty owners as well as the working interest owners. Id. These differences in
the royalty provisions for oil and gas are due largely to the physical differences between
the two substances. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 271-72 (3d ed.
1995). Specifically, oil can be stored easily and economically, unlike gas, which must be
delivered into a pipeline. Id. at 272.
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However, because of ambiguities in the lease royalty clause and
complications in the chain of title, controversies frequently arise
regarding the allocation of the production or the proceeds received
from the sale of the production. Therefore, to protect themselves

against liability for conversion or for failure to account properly,8
lessees or third-party purchasers historically have implemented an
additional document in the payment process: the division order. 9

Co-tenants are entitled to their fair share of production or proceeds from sale. If the
lessee has not received a lease from all of the co-tenants, then the lessee will be required to
account to the nonjoined co-tenants. The basis for the accounting is net profits. See RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS

§ 5.1, at 202-06 (3d ed. 1991) (address-

ing right of nonjoined co-tenants to receive proportionate share of products produced after
producing co-tenant recoups costs).
8. RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 7.5, at 390 (3d ed. 1991).
Authorities have also noted that the nature of the oil and gas provisions in the lease royalty
clause will dictate the appropriate cause of action. Id. § 7.5, at 392 n.107. To recover under
a conversion theory, for example, a lessor must show she owned title to the oil or gas taken
by the purchaser. Id. Therefore, when royalties can be paid "in kind," the lessor retains
title; failure to turn over the lessor's production is grounds for conversion. Id. However,
when royalties are to be paid "in money," as provided in the gas royalty clause, and the
lessee fails to account for the money received for the lessor's production, the proper remedy is an action for unsecured debt. Id. For an example of a court stressing this distinction,
see Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61, 67 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 907 (1957), which noted that because the gas royalty clause divested the lessor of title,
"[hlis claim can only be for a payment in money and not for the product itself." But see
infra Part IV.A. (questioning whether "in-kind" royalty option justifies treating oil division
order differently from gas division order).
9. Si M. Bondurant, Royalty Owner Rights Under Division Orders,25 TULSA L.J. 571,
572 (1990); see Martin R. Bennett, Comment, Division Orders: Impact of the Payment for
Proceeds of Sale Statute, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 513, 514 (1995) (noting protective role of
division order in shielding operators or purchasers from liability for conversion); see also
JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 387 (3d ed. 1995) (stating that
"[d]ivision orders protect purchasers of production and those who distribute proceeds by
warranting title to production transferred and indemnifying them for payments made.").
In general terms, a division order may be defined as "the instrument through which an
interest owner authorizes another party to make distribution of the proceeds from the sale
of production." Si M. Bondurant, Royalty Owner Rights Under Division Orders, 25 TULSA
L.J. 571, 573-74 (1990). The origin of the division order can be traced to the early part of
this century when oil was the primary product sold:
It was sold to third-party purchasers who were neither operators nor owners of any of
the oil and gas interests and who were in the business of buying crude oil as a raw
material for the refining business. Crude oil at that time was marketed primarily
through pipelines and later railroads and eventually trucks which purchased the oil at
the well and hauled for hire the production to market. Generally, the purchasers
would assume the responsibility of distributing the proceeds to the owners. The purchasers developed the division order to provide protection from liability in making
distribution of proceeds from production.
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In its simplest form, the division order is a relatively short docu-

ment that the lessees or the purchasers of the production (payors)
send to royalty owners and other interested parties (payees) in order to affirm the size of each payee's interest. 10 Generally, the division order asks the payee to warrant or to certify his or her
interest, and to indemnify the payor in the event the payee is overpaid." Because the basis for calculating the royalty is not defined
specifically in the lease royalty clause,'2 payors also use division
orders to specify the terms of the oil or gas sales contract. In turn,
these terms are intended 3to provide the basis for calculating the
payee's royalty payment.'
Id. at 572. The history and significance of the division order have been well explored. E.g.,
Si M. Bondurant, Royalty Owner Rights Under Division Orders, 25 TULSA L.J. 571 (1990);
David E. Pierce, Resolving Division Order Disputes: A Conceptual Approach, 35 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 16-1 (1989); Jane Fleck Romanov, The Division Order: Is It Still a
Shield Against Liability?, 3 TEX. OIL & GAS L.J. 25 (Jan.-Mar. 1989); Ernest E. Smith,
Royalty Issues: Take-or-Pay Claims and Division Orders, 24 TULSA L.J. 509 (1989); Marvin
G. Twenhafel, Oil-Gas Division Orders: Their Origin, Varieties, and Usage 27B RocKY
MTN.MIN. L. INST. 1479 (1982); Richard F. Brown, Texas Division Orders and the Texas
Division Order Statute, THE LANDMAN, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 23; Stuart Hollimon, Division
Orders-A Primer,34TH OIL & GAS INST. 313 (1983).
One commentator has suggested the division order gets its name from "the fact that it
sets out the division of interest in the oil run into the pipeline, among the royalty owners
and lease owners." 1 EARL A. BROWN, THE LAW OF OIL & GAS LEASES § 6.01, at 6-4 to
6-5 (2d ed. 1996).
10. 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACOUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS
§ 6.5, at 289 (1996).
The three basic types of division orders are: (1) a third-party purchaser division order,
(2) an indemnity division order, and (3) a lessee/purchaser division order. Si M.
Bondurant, Royalty Owner Rights Under Division Orders, 25 TULSA L.J. 571, 574 (1990).
The third-party purchaser division order is from "both the lessor and lessee directed to a
third-party purchaser who assumes the responsibility for disbursing proceeds from production directly to the royalty owner and the working interest owner for their respective
shares of proceeds." Id. The indemnity division order is from "the lessee to the purchaser,
whereupon the purchaser pays the lessee for 100% of the production and the lessee assumes the responsibility for disbursing royalties." Id. The lessee/purchaser division order
is "a direction from the royalty owner to the lessee to assume responsibility for disbursing
proceeds to the royalty owner." Id. at 574-75. Therefore, it is obvious that not all division
orders are signed by royalty owners; some are between the operator and purchaser. The
main focus of this Article is the effect of lessees' division orders, which have been signed by
royalty owners, on the lessees' royalty obligation.
11. 4 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 704.1, at
579-80 (1995). The payee who has been underpaid has a remedy against the overpaid
owners. Id.
12. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
13. See JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 426 (3d ed. 1995) (recognizing that payors commonly use division order "to give instructions.., for payment of the
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Although these division-order terms generally are supplied as
part of a genuine effort to clarify royalty payments, they sometimes
are used blatantly and unilaterally to change the payor's liability
under the lease royalty clause.' 4 Thus, despite the division order's
seemingly innocuous nature, courts consistently have been required to resolve controversies about its effect on the lessee's royalty obligation.
Unfortunately, in resolving these disputes, Texas courts ultimately have failed to adopt a guiding theory. 15 Instead, they have
vacillated between the competing policies raised in these disputes
by promoting either (1) the need to protect producers with stability
and finality in the payment process, or (2) the need to protect royalty owners from being unfairly denied their rights under the lease
royalty clause.' 6 In an attempt to provide some clarity where the
proceeds of sale"). This use of the division order is particularly relevant when the lease
provides that the royalty shall be calculated on a "proceeds" or "amount realized" basis.
In such a case, it is necessary for the lessee/payor to spell out the exact terms of the contract from which the "proceeds" will be "realized" once those contracts are ultimately
negotiated.
14. The classic example of using a division order to alter the payor's liability involves
the substitution of an "amount realized" standard when a lease requires royalties to be
calculated on the "market value" of the gas standard. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
Professor Pierce explains:
Lessees seem to abhor the idea of consulting lessors after they have obtained their
signature on the oil and gas lease.... Traditionally, lessees have turned to more clandestine means such as tendering division orders containing 'clarifying' language or
language designed to change the royalty provisions of the oil and gas lease to try and
resolve royalty calculation issues with lessors.
David E. Pierce, Royalty Calculation in a Restructured Gas Market, 13 E. MIN. L. FOUND.
§ 18.02[1], at 18-5 (1992).
15. Many writers have lamented the courts' failure to resolve the issue conclusively.
E.g., Si M. Bondurant, Royalty Owner Rights Under Division Orders, 25 TULSA L.J. 571,
572-74 (1990); David E. Pierce, Resolving Division Order Disputes: A Conceptual Approach, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 16-01, at 16-2 (1989); Ernest E. Smith, Royalty
Issues: Take-or-Pay Claims and Division Orders, 24 TULSA L.J. 509, 510-13 (1989); Richard F. Brown, Texas Division Orders and the Texas Division Order Statute, in THE
LANDMAN, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 23, 23; see also discussion infra Part II.A.1. (reviewing
courts' treatment of contract and estoppel as conceptual constructs for resolving division
order disputes).
16. The courts' vacillation between these competing policies is most evident in the
Supreme Court of Texas's two opinions in Exxon Corp. v. Middleton. In an original opinion, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the division orders did not amend the lease
royalty clause, determining that "these documents are not contracts" that bind the payees.
Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 6, 13-14 (Oct. 1, 1980), withdrawn, 613
S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). More specifically, that first opinion contended that division orders
were not "intended to afford a lessee the opportunity to amend the lease, relieve himself of
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courts had not, the Texas legislature also addressed these competing policies and enacted provisions in 1991 governing division orders signed after that date. 17 Because those provisions are
prospective only, however, case law will remain relevant for disputes stemming from division orders executed prior to 1991. In
order to resolve these division-order disputes effectively in the future, courts and, likely, the legislature, must continue to strive both
to clarify the law and to balance the competing policy interests of
producers and royalty owners.
The purpose of this Article is to provide a practical analysis of
the interaction of the lease royalty clause and the division order
under Texas statutory and case law. As a paradigm for this analysis, the Article focuses on the recent court of appeals and Supreme
Court of Texas opinions in Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank.18 The ultimate goals of this Article are to delineate the
framework for resolving royalty payment disputes involving division orders, to analyze the differences between case law and statutory provisions, and to highlight conflicts within both the cases and
the statutes. Furthermore, a final section addresses division-order
disputes destined to be decided in the coming decade.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF DIVISION-ORDER CASE LAW

Historically, the division-order disputes causing the most significant legal debate have arisen when a payee asserts that royalty payments are deficient for one of the following reasons: (1) the payor
has incorrectly determined the gross value of the production before
calculating royalties, either by using the "amount realized" standard in place of the "market value" standard, 19 or by improperly
marketing the production;20 (2) the payor has erroneously used a
lease obligation, or secure advantages over the lessor which could not be asserted under
the provisions of the lease." Id. at 14. In a second opinion, the supreme court reversed its
stance and adopted a rule that serves the producer's goals by holding that division orders

are binding until revoked. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 250-51 (Tex. 1981).
For a further exploration of the Middleton court's vacillation, see discussion infra Part
II.A.1.
17. TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 91.401-.406 (Vernon 1993 & Supp. 1996); see discussion infra Part III (examining Texas division-order statutes).
18. 895 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995), rev'd, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 537 (Apr. 25,
1996).
19. See infra Part II.A.1.
20. See infra Part II.A.2.
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fractional interest in the order that is smaller than that actually
owned by the payee; 21 or (3) the division order allows the payor to
deduct too many costs from the payee's royalty.22 InTexas, each
reason has produced case law, reviewed below, governing the effect

of the division order on the lease royalty clause.
A.

Incorrect Determinationsof the Gross Value of Production

1. The "Market Value Royalty" Cases
The "market value royalty" cases illustrate the essence of a typical division-order dispute: it begins with the lease royalty clause.23
In other words, the effect of the division order on the lessee's royalty obligation becomes an issue only after courts have interpreted
the lease language to determine that obligation. Determination of
gas royalties is particularly convoluted because of the unique effects of regulation and market forces on gas prices,24 making the

gas royalty clause a perennial subject for judicial interpretation.
The gas royalty clause in the typical oil and gas lease is bifurcated.25 It uses different terms for calculating royalty depending on
whether the gas is "sold at the wells" or "sold or used off the premises.''26 Under the typical gas royalty clause, if the gas is "sold at
the wells," then royalties are to be based on the "amount realized"

21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part II.C.2-3.
23. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 241 (Tex. 1981) (stating that "[t]he
problem begins with the gas royalty clause"). In particular, if the payee is a non-participating royalty or mineral owner, rather than a lessor, the problem begins with interpreting the
document that created the interest. Such was the case in Gavenda v. Strata Energy Inc.,
705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986). See discussion infra Part II.B.
24. John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMU L. REV. 223, 232-33
(1996).
25. For an example of a typical "bifurcated" gas royalty clause see supra note 2.
26. Texas courts have determined that gas is sold "at the well," or "on the premises,"
if it is sold within lease lines. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 243. In Middleton, the court expressly disapproved of the approach used by the El Paso Court of Appeals in Butler v.
Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which had
defined "premises" to include the field. Id. at 243-44.
However, in Piney Woods County Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., rather than focusing on lease
lines, the court recognized that the terms "at the well" and "off the premises" were used,
respectively, to distinguish between gas that did not need to be processed and gas that had
to be transported for processing. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d 225, 240 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied,
750 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985). Therefore, for the Piney
Woods court, it was the quality of the gas, and not strictly the geographic lease lines, that
determined whether gas was sold "on or off the premises."
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from the sale.z7 If, however, the gas is sold "off the premises" then

the clause provides that royalties shall be based on the "market
value at the well."'2 8 Once a court determines that the gas has been
sold "off the premises," the next obvious question becomes when
and how to calculate "market value at the well."

The meaning of the phrase "market value at the well" became a
crucial issue for the courts during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
At that time, market conditions had created a significant divergence between the proceeds received by lessees under their longterm gas contracts and the actual market value of the gas on the
day of production. The use of such long-term gas sales contracts
had pervaded the oil and gas industry from the 1930s through the
mid-1980s,29 largely due to government regulation and economic
considerations. 30 During the late 1970s, changing market forces
and new government policies combined to cause prices prevailing
on the day of production to exceed sales prices under the long-term
contracts to which many lessees had dedicated their gas. 3 1 Conse27. Supra note 2.
28. Id.
29. See EUGENE 0. KUNTZ ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 250
(2d ed. 1993) (noting that use of long-term gas sales contracts was industry standard "from
the time that interstate pipelines were constructed in the 1930s until the mid-1980s").
30. Id. One group of commentators succinctly described the factors influencing widespread use of long-term contracts as follows:
In part, long contract terms reflected regulatory requirements. The Natural Gas Act
of 1938 required that gas dedicated into interstate commerce be subject to a minimum
fifteen year contract to assure that the 'public convenience' would be served by a
certain supply. Economic considerations also demanded long contract terms. Longterm commitments were a condition of the complex financing arrangements entered
into for the construction of many of the interstate pipelines. Even after the construction loans were paid, pipeline maintenance and operation generated high fixed costs,
so that pipeline gas buyers made long contract terms a high priority in negotiations.
Id. at 250-51.
Professor John Lowe describes the "linear" structure of gas markets that resulted largely
from government regulation:
Producers extracted natural gas and sold it to pipelines at the well head or in the field
under long-term contracts that obligated the pipeline to take or pay for minimum
quantities of production. Pipelines bought gas from producers and sold it to local
distribution companies, state-regulated public utilities that supply gas at the burnertip, using minimum commodity bill tariffs to shift the risk of their take-or-pay obligations to producers. Local distribution companies retailed gas to end-users.
John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation,49 SMU L. REV. 223, 224 (1996).
31. See John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation,49 SMU L. REV. 223, 232-33
(1996) (noting that 1970s and 1980s were marked by "a combination of market forces and
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quently, the definition of "market value at the well" became a focal
point of litigation.32
Lessees argued that because they were forced to dedicate the gas

to long-term contracts, those contract prices should represent the
"market value" of the gas. 33 Such an interpretation was clearly in
the lessees' best interest, for if "market value at the well" was

equated with the prevailing price on the day of production, then
many lessees would have been required to calculate royalties on a
basis exceeding their actual proceeds. Lessors, however, chal-

lenged the lessees' interpretation, and asserted that the phrase
"market value at the well" always contemplated the current market
value of the gas.34
Ultimately, the lessees' argument was hindered by the presence
of the bifurcated payment scheme in their leases, which called for

basing royalties upon either the "market value at the well" of the
gas or on the "amount realized" from its sale. Lessees asserted
that each of these valuation terms permitted them to calculate roy-

alties based upon their long-term contract prices. Their assertions
inevitably led lessors and courts to question why the gas royalty

clause contained two different valuation terms if those terms actually established the same basis for royalty calculations.35
Thus, in determining the meaning of "market value" in the ensuing royalty disputes, courts chose between two contrasting ap-

government regulation [that] caused new gas contract prices to escalate faster than regulated long-term contract price adjustments").
32. See EUGENE 0. KuNTz ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 268
(2d ed. 1993) (recognizing market value royalty problem as "one of the most widely litigated and expensive issues of the oil and gas industry during the 1970s and early 1980s").
33. John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMU L. REV. 223, 233 (1996).
34. E.g., Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 240; Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866
(Tex. 1968); Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269 (Okla. 1981).
35. See John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation,49 SMU L. REV. 223, 233-34
(1996) (addressing lessors' and lessees' contradictory interpretations of phrase "market
value"). Professor Lowe contends that both of the interpretations failed to recognize the
"original purpose of the royalty clause." Id. at 233 n.58. He then explains that lessees
originally included the term "market value" in the royalty clause to ensure that if a lack of
markets or the presence of better distant markets precluded sales at the well, then the
lessee would have a right to "work back" to the value of the gas at the well by deducting
the added costs, such as those incurred in transporting the gas for processing. Id.; see John
S. Lowe, Developments in Non-Regulatory Oil and Gas Law, 32 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N 117, 144-52 (1981) (discussing original reasons for inclusion of phrase "market
value" in lease royalty clause). For a succinct discussion of the "market value royalty"
problem, see JOHN S.LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 278-79 (3d ed. 1995).
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proaches. Some jurisdictions, including Louisiana,36 Oklahoma, 37

and Arkansas, 38 viewed the lease as a "cooperative venture," which
required considering the marketing realities that had confined les-

sees to long-term contracts. Those jurisdictions allowed lessees to
calculate "market value" royalties on the basis of their lower contract price.39 Other states, including Texas, applied the "plain
meaning" rule to the lease language.4" Therefore, in the noted case
of Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela,41 the Supreme Court of Texas
held that "market value" means "the prevailing market price" at

the time of production, regardless of the financial burden that such
an interpretation places on the lessee who has entered into longterm gas sales contracts.42

36. See Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334, 1338-39 (La. 1982) (finding it necessary to consider "the necessary realities of the oil and gas industry" in interpretation of lease royalty clause that called for payments to be based on "market value").
37. See Tara Petroleum Corp., 630 P.2d at 1273 (recognizing long-term gas contract as
"necessity of the market ... that lessors and lessees know and consider . . . when they
negotiate oil and gas leases").
38. See Hillard v. Stephens, 637 S.W.2d 581, 583-84 (Ark. 1982) (acknowledging market conditions that dictated common use of long-term gas sales contracts).
39. See Hillard,637 S.W.2d at 583 (holding that "prevailing market price at well" was
equivalent to lower contract price that lessee-producer received under its long-term sales
contracts); Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1341 (interpreting "market value" to be equivalent to
producer's long-term contract price); Tara Petroleum Corp., 630 P.2d at 1274 (resolving
ambiguity in favor of lessees by restricting inquiry "to whether the sale was a reasonable
contract when made" and finding that producer's long-term contract was "market value").
40. See John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation,49 SMU L. REV. 223, 233-36
(1996) (examining "plain meaning" and "cooperative venture" approaches for interpreting
meaning of market value). A majority of states have followed a "plain meaning" approach. Id. at 233. In addition to Texas, states such as Kansas, Montana, North Dakota,
Mississippi, and West Virginia equate market value with value on the day of production.
Id.; see also Bruce M. Kramer, Royalty Interest in the United States: Not Cut from the Same
Cloth, 29 TULSA L.J. 449, 464-68 (1994) (analyzing divergence of opinions in construing
"market value royalty" clause); David E. Pierce, Royalty Calculationin a Restructured Gas
Market, 13 E. MIN. L. FOUND. § 18.03[1] (1992) (evaluating use or nonuse of marketing
realities in resolving market value royalty disputes).
41. 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
42. Vela, 429 S.W.2d at 871. The Vela court relied heavily on Foster v. Atlantic Ref.
Corp., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964), in reaching its decision. Id. In Foster,the lease royalty
clause had required the lessee to pay royalty on 1/8th of the gas produced and saved from
the leased premises on the basis of the "market price prevailing for the field where produced when run." Foster, 329 F.2d at 490 (emphasis added). The Vela majority, however,
ignored this "when run" language in construing the terms of the royalty clause. See Vela,
429 S.W.2d at 880 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (contending that majority should not have
relied on Foster because royalty clause at issue did not contain similar "market price when
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Division orders played a strong supporting role in these "market
value royalty" payment disputes. Saddled with royalty clauses that
courts had interpreted contrary to their interests, lessees turned to
the division order in an attempt to "clarify" that royalty payments
would be calculated on the amounts they actually realized from

their gas sales contracts. Thus, courts were faced with determining
how conflicting division-order language would affect the lease royalty clause.

In analyzing the effect of such conflicting division orders, a 1978
"market value royalty" case turned to theories of contract and estoppel. In Butler v. Exxon,43 the court held that division orders
providing for royalty payments on the basis of the lessee's gas sales
contracts were not binding on the royalty owners under either contract or estoppel theory."

The orders did not constitute binding

contracts, according to the court, because they had been executed
without consideration. 5 Furthermore, the court reasoned that estoppel theory failed to protect the lessee because it had not detrimentally relied on the division orders.46 Accordingly, the royalty
owners in Butler were entitled to recover for the underpayments
that had resulted when the lessee had valued their royalty on the

run" language and because Fostercourt gave no indication that it would have reached same
result in absence of such language). As one author explains:
[M]any industry representatives considered the terms of the royalty clause in Foster to
be so unusual that they believed the when run language contained therein played a
central role in the Foster court's decision and considered the Foster decision as being
effectively limited to its facts. Consequently, the result in Vela surprised many persons
in the industry despite the clear implication of the language in Foster.
Stuart C. Hollimon, Exxon Corporation v. Middleton: Some Answers But Additional Confusion in the Volatile Area of Market Value Gas Royalty Litigation, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 9
n.24 (1981).
43. 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. Butler, 559 S.W.2d at 417.
45. Id.
46. Id. As part of its estoppel analysis, the Butler court distinguished Chicago Corp. v.
Wall, 156 Tex. 217, 293 S.W.2d 844 (1956), an earlier case involving an oil royalty division
order dispute. Id. In Wall, two interest owners executed transfer orders that erroneously
stated that they had transferred all of their properties when, in fact, they had only transferred one. Wall, 293 S.W.2d at 846. Earlier, the interest owners had executed valid division orders. Id. at 845. The court held the division orders and the transfer orders were
binding since the evidence showed the payor had relied on them in making payments. Id.
at 846.
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basis of the long-term contract price, rather than on the prevailing
market price.47
Under the Butler decision and others, 48 division-order jurisprudence in Texas appeared to be premised on theories of estoppel

and contract. Those theories require fact-specific inquiries about
consideration and reliance. Such was the case for the lower courts
in Exxon v. Middleton,49 the seminal "market value royalty" case
decided a year after Butler.
Engaging in the contract analysis suggested in Butler, the appellate court in Middleton found consideration for division orders that
the royalty owners, the Middletons, had executed to one of the

producers, Sun. 50 Undertaking a fact-specific inquiry, the court
found consideration on the basis of new obligations undertaken by
Sun in the division orders, including the duty to make charts and
records available to the royalty owners. 51 The Middletons contended that they had implicitly revoked the division orders by filing
the lawsuit. 52 The court rejected the Middletons' contention, hold-

ing that the division orders were supported by consideration and
that they "constituted binding written contracts. ' 53 On this basis,
the court concluded that the division orders were not unilaterally
revocable, thereby barring the Middletons' claim against Sun for
54
underpayment of royalties.

By barring the royalty owners' claims, the appellate court in
Middleton reinforced producers' expectations in the use of division
47. See Butler, 559 S.W.2d at 417 (allowing recovery of "gas royalty payment for all
gas sold ... based on market value at the time of delivery").
48. See, e.g., Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Long, 340 F.2d 211, 223 (5th Cir. 1964)
(viewing division order as operative instrument of transfer that is binding until revoked);
Chicago Corp. v. Wall, 156 Tex. 217, 293 S.W.2d 844, 846-47 (1956) (relying on theory of
estoppel to protect payor from double liability in dispute between royalty owners); Hogg v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 267 S.W. 482,484-85 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, judgm't adopted)
(using estoppel to find lessee liable for conversion of lessor's lien interest in third party's
share of royalty only after lessee was notified); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell,
183 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd) (stating that "[a] division
order is ordinarily the contract under which the production is purchased or accepted for
transportation by the pipeline company.").
49. 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978), rev'd in part, 613
S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981).
50. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d at 365.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 364.
53. Id. at 365.
54. Id.
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orders. In particular, the court's holding implicitly advanced the
two main policy interests behind producers' use of the division order: injecting stability into the payment process and providing protection against liability. The Middleton opinion, however, was not
entirely pro-producer. Instead, the court also evidenced a desire to
protect royalty owners from the misuse of division orders by
stating:
We should not be understood as holding that the execution of division orders would prevent relief from fraud, accident or mistake or
preclude the correction of mathematical calculations. Nor do we in
any way indicate that relief could not be obtained from unusual or
unfair provisions imposed
by a party having a superior bargaining
55
power or position.
After the Butler and Middleton appellate decisions, the common
law of division orders in Texas was colored by two concepts. First,
Texas case law expressly embraced estoppel and contract as guiding theories. Second, cases acknowledged a need to protect royalty
owners from unfair use of the division order by lessees. After the
supreme court's final decision in Middleton, however, those concepts would fade from the focus of Texas division-order
jurisprudence.
In an initial opinion later withdrawn, 6 the Supreme Court of
Texas contradicted the appellate court's contract analysis. 7 In that
first opinion, the supreme court declared that division orders were
"not contracts," and, therefore, did not amend the lessee's royalty
obligation under the lease. 58 The supreme court, however, reiterated the appellate court's view of the lessee's royalty obligation
and observed that the division order "was never intended to afford
a lessee the opportunity to amend the lease, relieve himself of lease
obligation, or secure advantages over the lessor that could not be
asserted under the provisions of the lease. ' 59
Despite this apparent rejection of a contract analysis, this initial
supreme court opinion did, at least, continue to further the appel55. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d at 365.
56. Exxon v. Middleton, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 6 (Oct. 1, 1980), withdrawn, 613 S.W.2d
240 (Tex.1981).
57. Id. at 14.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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late court's concept of protecting the interests of royalty owners.
In its final substituted opinion, however, the supreme court deleted
all references to contract analysis and relegated the provisions
favoring royalty owners to footnote status. 6° Moreover, by failing
to seek evidence of reliance and detriment, the court eschewed es-

toppel theory.61 Thus, instead of deducing a result from the application of a guiding theory, the court pronounced a rule devoid of a

theoretical basis. Relying on an earlier Supreme Court of Texas
case, Chicago Corp. v. Wall, 62 and several cases from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 63 the court held sim-

ply that division orders are binding "for the time and to the extent
that they have been, or are being acted on and made the basis of
settlements and payments," but that "they cease to be binding"
once revoked by either party.64 With the supreme court's holding
60. Exxon v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 251 n.8 (Tex. 1981).
61. See 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND
GAS § 6.5, at 291-92 (1996) (asserting that Middleton rule is not consistent with theories of
contract, estoppel, or accord and satisfaction); see also Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705
S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. 1986) (noting that Middleton court found division orders binding
"even though there had been no detrimental reliance").
62. 156 Tex. 217, 293 S.W.2d 844 (1956). In Wall, the gas royalty owners executed
"division orders" listing their respective interests in the royalty, and submitted them to the
gas purchaser. Wall, 293 S.W.2d at 845. The plaintiffs, who had executed the division order, then sold royalty interests to a third party and executed a "transfer order" covering
the interest. Id. Thereafter, the gas purchaser paid royalties as directed by the "transfer
order." Id. Plaintiffs later sued the gas purchaser for underpayment, alleging that the
"transfer order" incorrectly stated the proportionate interest sold by plaintiffs to the third
party. Id. at 846. The supreme court held that the plaintiffs were bound by their orders of
transfer, even though they misstated the properties transferred, until they were revoked.
Id. at 847.
63. E.g., J. M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1966); Pan American
Petroleum Co. v. Long, 340 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1964); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Williams,
158 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1946). Although cited by the supreme court in Middleton, Long
actually did not address the effect of a division order on the lease royalty clause. Instead,
the controversy arose in the slant-hole drilling controversies in East Texas. Long, 340 F.2d
at 213. The Long court focused on the division orders merely to establish that the slantedon oil company could recover, based on conversion, from the financial institution that received the proceeds from the stolen oil from the purchasing pipelines. Id. at 222-24. The
Fifth Circuit reviewed Texas cases and concluded that the institution's right to revoke the
division order was strong proof of control, which is essential to success in a suit for conversion. Id. at 223.
64. See Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 250 (holding that division orders are binding on
royalty owners until lessee is served with copies of royalty owner's pleadings in suit to
recover deficiencies in royalty payment); Ernest E. Smith, Royalty Issues: Take-or-Pay
Claims and Division Orders (noting that division orders in Middleton were considered revoked when lessors filed suit and that lessee could only recover market value after such
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in Middleton, Texas division-order jurisprudence became dominated by the binding-until-revoked rule.

A definitive rule that division orders are binding until revoked
frees lessees from the factual shackles of proving consideration or
reliance and blatantly promotes the producers' interests. Such a

rule also injects certainty into the payment process and provides
payors with protection from suits by royalty owners who have
signed division orders but later argue that they have been underpaid. 65 Despite its pro-producer overtones, the Middleton opinion does not ignore entirely the competing concerns of royalty

owners. Specifically, in footnote 8, the opinion adopts verbatim
the appellate court's qualifying language, which ensures fairness to
royalty owners by suggesting exceptions to the binding-until-revoked rule.66
2.

Implied Covenants and Division Orders

As described above, in interpreting the effect of division orders

on the "market value royalty" obligation in the lease, courts struggled to balance the competing interests of producers and royalty
owners. Similarly, the courts repeated this struggle in cases involving royalty owners who asserted breaches of the implied covenant

of marketing in challenges to the gross values producers had placed
on their production. For example, in Amoco Production Co. v.
time), in

STATE BAR OF TEX., PROF'L DEV. PROGRAM, ADVANCED OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL LAW COURSE K, K-23 (1988). But see infra Part III.B. (discussing conflicting meth-

ods for revoking division orders under Texas statutes).
Under the rule espoused in Middleton, division orders have been held to be revocable by
the lessee as well as by the lessor. For example, Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, involved a lease
that contained, in addition to a 1/8th royalty provision, a reservation to the lessors of 1/2 of
the net profits from the 7/8ths working interest. 626 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Tex. 1981). For
several years the lessee had paid the lessors net profits on both oil and natural gas production. Id. However, the lessee later revoked the division orders after determining that it
had misinterpreted the net profits requirement and had overpaid royalties. Id. at 733. In
response, the lessors asserted estoppel, ratification, and waiver based on the lessee's division orders. Id. The court ultimately rejected the lessor's argument that the lessee was still
obligated to make payments on the net profits interest for gas after the division orders
were revoked. Id. at 734. The lessee, however, did not seek reimbursement for past overpayments. Id.
65. See Union Producing Co. v. Driskell, 117 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1941) (announcing: "We know of no principal upon which competent persons who have agreed upon a
fixed price can, after accepting it for some years, repudiate the agreement and claim more,
merely because they think the price is too low.").
66. Middleton. 613 S.W.2d at 251 n.8.
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FirstBaptist Church of Pyote,67 a decision announced before Middleton, the lessors premised their claim for royalty underpayments
upon a breach of the implied covenant of marketing. 68 More specifically, the lessors alleged that the lessees had procured too low a
price in contracting to sell the gas. 69 The lessees countered that the
terms of a division order shielded them from liability. 70 The court
rejected the lessees' argument, holding that a division order could
not provide protection from liability for breach of the implied covenant of marketing. 71 Emphasizing the policy of protecting royalty
owners, the Pyote court concluded:
[T]he purposes for which the [division] order is executed and the
type of economic duress which prescribes it repel the implication
that it is intended to affect the obligations of the operator to the
royalty owner ... the mere execution of a division order ... ought

not to preclude the royalty owner from asserting a breach of implied
obligation against the operator.72
For several years, Pyote apparently set the standard for Texas
courts faced with determining the effect of division orders in cases
involving alleged breaches of the implied covenant of marketing.
67. 579 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979), writ refd per curiam n.r.e.,
611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).
68. First Baptist Church of Pyote, 579 S.W.2d at 284.

69. Id. Amoco held an oil and gas lease on property owned by First Baptist Church of
Pyote. Id. at 282. Amoco then entered into a marketing contract with Lone Star Gas Co.

and Delhi Pipeline Co., in which Amoco agreed to sell gas from First Baptist Church's land
for prices lower than those being paid by other purchasers, in exchange for interests in
other wells not owned by First Baptist. Id.
70. Id. at 288.
71. Id. The division orders contained the following language:
The following covenants are parts of this instrument and shall be binding on the undersigned, their successors, legal representatives, and assigns:
Gas: Settlements for gas shall be based on the net proceeds at the wells, after deducting a fair and reasonable charge for compressing and making it merchantable and for
transporting if the gas is sold off the property. Where gas is sold subject to regulation
by the Federal Power Commission or other governmental authority, the price applicable to such sale approved by order of such authority shall be used to determine the net
proceeds at the wells.
Id.

In contrast to the majority, the dissent concluded that the division orders were binding
contracts that presented "a bar to the recovery." Id. at 290 (Preslar, C.J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 288 (alteration in original) (quoting MAURICE H. MERRILL, COVENANTS
IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § 209A (2d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1964)).
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Then, in Cabot Corp. v. Brown,73 a case decided after Middleton,

the court retreated from the Pyote position and reasserted the
binding-until-revoked rule. 4 Like Middleton, Cabot was a "market

value royalty" case.
In the typical "market value royalty" case, the court interprets
the gas royalty clause to require the lessee to calculate royalties on
a market value basis. Next, the court questions whether the division order has changed that obligation. Logically, answering that

question would seem to require the court to interpret the terms of
the division order.
Although courts undertook the step of interpreting the division

order in several cases,75 interpretation of the division order was not
an issue in most of the "market value royalty" cases prior to Cabot.

In those cases, the division orders clearly replaced the lease's "market value royalty" standard with an "amount realized" or proceeds
basis for calculating royalties.

Arguably, the Cabot division order was not so clear. It provided
that the lessee would pay royalties based on the price determined
by the Federal Power Commission (FPC), but only "if such sale be
subject to the Federal Power Commission. ' 76 In marketing the gas,
the lessee originally executed a gas exchange agreement with an

interstate pipeline company, thereby clearly subjecting the sale to
FPC price regulation, 77 but later obtained an exemption that allowed sale of the gas at higher intrastate prices. 78 The lessor then

claimed that her royalty had been improperly calculated on the
lower FPC price and brought suit seeking recovery for the un73. 754 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1987).
74. Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 107-08.
75. Several courts have interpreted division orders and have found no conflict between the division order and the lease. See, e.g., Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank,
39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 537, 540 (Apr. 25, 1996) (rejecting lower court's "discussion about the
effect of a division order that contradicts the lease terms"); Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co.,
39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 533, 535 (Apr. 25, 1996) (finding that royalty provisions in leases and in
one division order were not in conflict because they unambiguously required royalty owners to bear proportionate share of post-production costs); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Prickette,
653 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983, no writ) (determining that division order did not
change lessor's rights in lease); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell, 183 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd) (recognizing that division order only affected lessee
in its capacity as purchaser).
76. Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 105.
77. Id. at 105-06.
78. Id.
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derpayment.79 In this respect, the Cabot facts were analogous to
those in Middleton. However, unlike Middleton, the royalty owner
80
in Cabot also alleged a breach of the implied covenant to market.

Instead of interpreting the division order's provisions regarding
the valuation of the gas, the Cabot court simply invoked the bind-

ing-until-revoked rule.8 ' Moreover, the court expanded the effect
of the binding-until-revoked rule by holding that the division order
relieved the lessee of its implied covenant reasonably to market the
gas. 82 In determining the effect of division orders on implied covenants, the Cabot court was forced to distinguish the Pyote case. It
did so by noting that Pyote involved a "proceeds" royalty clause
rather than a "market value" clause. 83 Based upon this factual distinction, the Cabot court did not view Pyote as precluding the modification of implied covenant duties through division orders in
Cabot.84

79. Id. at 106.
80. Id.
81. Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 107-08; see David E. Pierce, Resolving Division Order Disputes: A ConceptualApproach, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 16.03[3], at 16-39 n.164
(1989) (suggesting that Cabot court should have determined jurisdictional nature of gas
since division order stated FPC prices would apply only if it "was subject to FPC jurisdiction"). The dissent in Cabot, however, did interpret the terms of the division order, and
concluded that the gas was subject to FPC jurisdiction. Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 109 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
82. Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 107. Significantly, the court apparently concluded that the
lease's implied covenant to market would have applied, but for the division order, even
though the "market value" basis applied. Yet many commentators consider that the implied covenant to market does not apply to the "market value royalty" standard. Instead,
they suggest that standard is determined by objective evidence of, for example, comparable
sales. See Thomas A. Harrell, Recent Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law, 31
INST. ON OIL & GAs L. & TAx'N 327, 328-46 (1980); Bruce M. Kramer & Chris Pearson,
The Implied Marketing Covenant in Oil and Gas Leases: Some Needed Changes for the
80's, 46 LA. L. REv. 787, 815 n.166 (1986). But at least one commentator has concluded
that implied covenants do apply to the "market value royalty" standard. See Jacqueline
Lang Weaver, When Express Clauses Bar Implied Covenants, Especially in Natural Gas
Marketing Scenarios, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 9-12,
14-15, on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
83. Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 107-08.
84. Id. The Cabot court neglected to address the strong language in Pyote condemning the use of division orders to dilute royalty owners' rights under the oil and gas lease.
See Ernest E. Smith, Royalty Issues: Take-or-Pay Claims and Division Orders (criticizing
Cabot for not making it "clear why specific lease language indicating how a royalty will be
calculated, e.g., 'when sold by lessee, one-eighth of the amount realized by lessee,' does not
negate the implied covenant to market gas at a reasonable price, whereas specific division
order language indicating the method of calculation has that effect"), in STATE BAR OF
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Relying on the foregoing, one might conclude that coupling
Cabot with Middleton creates a division-order jurisprudence for

Texas in which the producers' policies have prevailed. Yet, it
should not go unnoticed that those opinions also provide inroads
for royalty owners into the formidable binding-until-revoked rule.
First, while Cabot distinguished Pyote, it does so on the basis of the
specific language used in the division order, 5 suggesting that the

wording of the division order determines whether the implied covenant to market has been negated. Unfortunately, the Cabot court
failed to explain adequately why the Pyote division orders did not
negate the covenant while the provisions of the Cabot order did
relieve the lessee of implied obligations. 6 Second, the Middleton

opinion's footnote 8 expressly named instances that could create
exceptions to the binding-until-revoked rule in order to protect
royalty owners. Ultimately, in the 1986 case of Gavenda v. Strata
Energy, Inc.,87 the Supreme Court of Texas seized upon the suggestion of that Middleton footnote and created an exception to the
binding-until-revoked rule.
B.

"Erroneous" Division Orders Resulting in Underpayment-

Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc.
Unlike the previously discussed cases, Gavenda did not involve a
conflict between the lease royalty clause and a division order.
Rather, it involved a division order that misstated the interest, creTEX., PROF'L DEv. PROGRAM, ADVANCED OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL LAW COURSE K,
K-27 (1988); see also 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF
OIL AND GAS § 6.5, at 300 (1996) (criticizing Cabot for its ambiguity).

In his dissenting opinion in Cabot, Justice Kilgarlin indicated that the reasoning of Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell, 183 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd)
and Gavenda v. Strata Energy Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986), should be instructive even
though they did not involve claims of breach of implied covenants:
This court has displayed a willingness to recognize as non-binding division orders in
cases where the operator or lessee unjustly benefits. Implicit is the notion that division orders should not afford a lessee the opportunity to relieve himself of lease obligations or secure advantages over the lessor which he could not have asserted under
the provisions of the lease.
Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 110 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
85. Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 107.
86. In future cases, courts must decide whether other language used in division orders,
such as references to paying based on "posted prices" for oil, calls for applying the Cabot
or the Pyote holding. In other words, courts must determine whether valuation phrases are
analogous to a "market value" term or a "proceeds" term.
87. 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986).
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ated by reservation in a deed in the lessor's chain of title, of nonparticipating royalty owners, the Gavendas. 8 Yet, despite the
factual differences of Gavenda, the exception it created to the Middleton rule was applied recently by an appellate court in Heritage
Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank89 in resolving a conflict between a
lease royalty clause and division orders. For this reason, a review
of the Gavenda decision will aid in understanding the analysis of
the Heritage Resources opinion, as found in Part II of this Article,
and will assist in determining the viability of the Gavenda exception after the enactment of the 1991 statute governing division orders, as discussed in Part III.
In Gavenda, the attorney for the lease operator had mistakenly
interpreted the Gavenda's reservation as creating a 1/16th royalty
rather than the accurate 1/2 royalty. 90 Thereafter, the operator
prepared division orders which reflected the erroneous fraction, resulting in underpayments to the Gavendas totaling over two million dollars at least part of which the operator retained. 91 Upon
discovering the mistake, the Gavendas revoked the erroneous division orders and brought suit seeking damages incurred during the
92
time the division orders were in effect.
The operator responded to the Gavendas' suit by asserting Middleton's binding-until-revoked rule. The Gavendas contended that
an exception exists when unjust enrichment is involved. 93 The
supreme court recognized that Middleton considered the absence
of unjust enrichment as the basis for the binding-until-revoked
rule: "To provide stability in the oil and gas industry, we held for
the distributors of the proceeds because they had not profited from
their error in preparing the division order-in short, because there
was no unjust enrichment." 94 Therefore, the court held the operator liable "for whatever portion of [the Gavendas'] royalty it re88. Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. 1986).
89. 895 S.W.2d 833, 838-84 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995), rev'd, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 537
(Apr. 15, 1996).
90. Gavenda, 705 S.W.2d at 691.
91. Id. The Gavendas were underpaid by 7/16th royalty and 7/16ths of gross production. Id.
92. Id. The Gavendas revoked the division and transfer orders two days before their
fifteen-year term royalty reservation expired. Id. The lawsuit to recover underpayments
was filed later that year. Id.

93. Id.
94. Gavenda, 705 S.W.2d at 692.
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tained, although it is not liable to the Gavendas for any of their
royalties it paid out to various overriding or other royalty
owners. "95

The Gavenda decision creates an unjust-enrichment exception to
the Middleton binding-until-revoked rule which partially erodes
the role of the division order as a shield for producers against liability for past payments. The exception appears to apply where:
(1) an operator prepares "erroneous" division orders, (2) which error leads to underpayment to an interest owner, and (3) results in
unjust enrichment of the operator who profits at the expense of the
royalty owner. The lessee in this situation is liable for payments
made pursuant to the division orders, but only to the extent of the
royalties retained by the lessee.
A reasonable application of these criteria, however, reveals that
they could fit the facts of the cases that created the binding-untilrevoked rule. For example, it is difficult to discern why the
Gavenda division order was any more "erroneous" than other division orders. If the Gavenda division orders were "erroneous" because they conflicted with the provisions of a royalty deed, then so
too were the division orders in Cabot and Middleton "erroneous"
because they conflicted with the express or implied terms of the oil
and gas lease.
This elusiveness of the term "erroneous" is demonstrated further
by both the majority and dissenting opinions in Cabot. While the
Gavenda court appeared to consider the division order "erroneous" because its terms conflicted with the document creating the
royalty interest (the deed), neither the majority nor the dissenting
opinion in Cabot adopted that approach. Because the division order terms regarding payment in Cabot were not so clear as those in
Gavenda and Middleton, the appropriate question for the court
was not whether the orders were "erroneous," but whether the
95. Id. at 693. Note that on remand the appellate court ignored this proviso and held
the operator liable for interests paid out to overriding royalty owners. Strata Energy, Inc.
v. Gavenda, 753 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); see Jane F.
Romanov, The Division Order: Is It Still a Shield Against Liability, 3 TEx. OIL & GAS L.J.
1, 2 (1989) (criticizing appellate court decision on remand for its inconsistency with holding
of Supreme Court of Texas); see also Richard F. Brown, Texas Division Orders and the
Texas Division Order Statute, THE LANDMAN, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 23 (noting that although

appellate court decision appears to be inconsistent with Gavenda, there was no clarification by the Supreme Court of Texas because no writ was filed).
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plain language of those orders permitted the lessee to calculate
royalties on the basis of the FPC price. In fact, the royalty owner
in Cabot had argued that the division orders' payment terms did
not apply because the exchange between the lessee and the pipeline company was not a dedication to interstate commerce under
the federal regulatory scheme.96 Without interpreting the plain
language of the division orders, however, the majority opinion
summarily concluded that it was not necessary to review the question of dedication to interstate commerce.97 Instead, the majority
followed Middleton and held that the terms of the division order
were binding until revoked.98 The majority opinion did not even
discuss the question of whether the division orders were "erroneous," so as to invoke the Gavenda exception.
Despite taking a different approach, the dissenter in Cabot also
departed from the Gavenda court's approach to the "erroneous"
criterion. In his dissent, Justice Kilgarlin determined whether the
division order was "erroneous" by analyzing the specific language
in the division order that provided for payments "if such sale be
subject to the Federal Power Commission [FPC]," 99 noting that

FPC jurisdiction would not have been invoked if the gas had not
been dedicated to interstate commerce. 100 Absent FPC jurisdiction, he reasoned, the division orders would have been "erroneous" since royalties were calculated on the FPC rate. 10 1 Judge
Kilgarlin ultimately determined that the division orders were not
"erroneous," because the gas had been dedicated to interstate
commerce.10 2 If such an "erroneous" rate had been used, then Justice Kilgarlin would have determined that Gavenda provided relief
96. Cabot Corp. v. Brown, 754 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tex.1987); see also David E. Pierce,
Resolving Division Order Disputes: A Conceptual Approach, 35 RocKy MTN. MIN. L.

§ 16.03[3], at 16-39 n.164 (1989) (criticizing Cabot court for failing to apply plain
terms of division order).
INST.

97. Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 106.

98. Id. at 107.
99. Id. at 108-09 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 109 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
101. Id. at 108 (Kilgarlin, J.,
102. Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 109 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting). Justice Kilgarlin seems to
contradict himself on this issue, however. Later in the opinion he points out that because
the lessee obtained exempt status "Cabot was thus freed from FPC pricing jurisdiction."
Id. at 111. He was disturbed that, having obtained this exemption, Cabot received more

for the gas, but calculated royalty on a basis which was lower than what it had actually
received. Id. Justice Kilgarlin further stated:
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to the royalty owner for past underpayments, despite the division
10 3
order, because the lessee would have unjustly retained a benefit.
According to Justice Kilgarlin, then, a division order apparently is
"erroneous" not because its terms conflict with the lease royalty
clause, but because the lessee fails to follow its express terms.
The Cabot opinions demonstrate the amorphous contours of
Gavenda's "erroneous" criterion. Ironically, the Gavenda court's
justification for an exception based on "erroneous" division orders
is partly based on its "erroneous" reading of another case. °4 In
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell,10 5 a royalty owner sued to recover for an alleged underpayment caused by the lessee's deduc06
tion of a gross production tax from the royalty owner's payment.
The royalty owner pointed to the terms of the lease, which provided that royalties would be paid "without deduction of any kind
or character." 0 7 Attempting to avoid these lease terms, the lessee
countered that the royalty owner had signed a division order expressly permitting the deduction of the tax.'0 8 In pertinent part,
the division order in Terrell provided, "[s]ettlements and payments
shall be made monthly for oil received ... less any taxes required
by law to be deducted and paid by you (Stanolind) as
purchaser." 0 9
In rejecting the lessee's division-order defense, the court did not
find the division order nonbinding because it was "erroneous." Instead, the court interpreted the language of the division order, following the approach that should have been used in Cabot. The
court's interpretation led it to conclude that the division order afI can envision no case that would depict as well the inequity of the result reached by
the court today. Cabot reaped the benefits of FPC jurisdiction over the exchange with
Transwestern, paying out royalties based on the lower interstate market rate. Yet
Cabot sold the gas on the higher interstate market.
Id. This statement fits the Gavenda criterion of unjust enrichment. However, rather than
urge the application of the exception to the binding-until-revoked rule on this basis, Justice
Kilgarlin argued that the division order did not negate the implied covenant of marketing.
Id. at 110-11 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 108 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
104. Gavenda, 705 S.W.2d at 692 (citing Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell, 183
S.W.2d 743 (Tex.Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd)).
105. 183 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd).
106. Terrell, 183 S.W.2d at 743-44.
107. Id. at 744.
108. Id,
109. Id. at 745.

ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:353

fected the defendant in its position as purchaser, but not as
lessee. 110 Thus, Terrell merely stands for the proposition that the
division-order language must be carefully interpreted to determine
its effect on the lease royalty clause. Terrell does not support a rule
regarding an exception to the binding-until-revoked rule based on
"erroneous" division orders.

Although Terrell provides weak precedent for creating an exception to the Middleton rule, the Middleton opinion itself supplies a
respectable basis. As noted above, Middleton's footnote 8 considers the need for exceptions to the binding-until-revoked rule to

protect lessors from unfairness. By invoking unjust enrichment as
its justification for carving an exception to the binding-until-revoked rule, the Gavenda court does, at least, comport with Middleton's concern about unfairness.
Unfortunately, the unjust enrichment criterion of the Gavenda
exception can be just as elusive as the "erroneous" criterion. Arguably, the lessees in both Gavenda and Middleton were unjustly

enriched. Just as the operator in Gavenda benefited from the underpayment, caused by the use of the wrong fraction in calculating

royalty, the lessees in Middleton and the other "market value royalty" cases benefited by calculating royalties on a contract basis
lower than the prevailing market value."'

Despite this factual similarity in Gavenda and Middleton, the
cases can be distinguished on the question of unjust enrichment." 2
110. Id.
111. See 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND
GAS § 6.5, at 301-1 (1996) (arguing that unjust enrichment can be found in both Gavenda
and Middleton). Professors Smith and Weaver have written:
The court's distinction of Middleton is open to question. In both Gavenda and Middleton the lessees had prepared the division orders; hence the only reason given for
the difference in result was the presence or absence of benefit to the lessee from its
own mistake. But a lessee which fails to make out-of-pocket payments that are owed
to a royalty owner has benefited from its mistake as fully as a lessee which keeps
income that should have been paid to the royalty owner. The lessees in both instances
are wealthier to the extent that the royalty owner has failed to receive moneys owed to
him.
Id.
112. Professor Ernest Smith considered that, until recently, the Middleton and
Gavenda decisions could be distinguished on an "ad hoc basis," in which courts would
apply the unjust enrichment theory "if there has been an error or miscalculation in 'X' (the
fraction owed the royalty owner); [and] the theory that division orders are binding until
revoked would be applied if there has been a deliberate or accidental change in 'Y' (the
method for determining the value of production)." Ernest E. Smith, The New Division
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In Gavenda, the lessee retained money which had been received
for the production, an unjust enrichment. In Middleton, however,
the producers were not actually enriched, having never received
113
payment for the gas based on the higher prevailing market value.
This factual distinction between Middleton and Gavenda, rather
than the Terrell opinion or the "erroneous" criterion, should define
the Gavenda unjust-enrichment exception. In other words, the inquiry, when applying the Gavenda exception, should be simply
whether a lessee, in making payments pursuant to an unrevoked
division order, retained monies required by the lease royalty clause
(or a mineral or royalty deed) to be paid to the royalty owner. For
example, in Cabot, the Gavenda exception would apply if the
"market value" of the gas proved to be higher than the FPC price,
and if the lessee had actually received payment for the production
on the higher price. If the lessee, Cabot, had figured royalties on a
lower basis than the "market value" Cabot had received, then the
Gavenda exception should have provided relief for the royalty
owner." 4 In contrast, the Gavenda exception would not properly
apply in Middleton where the lessees figured royalties based on the
lower "amount realized" standard and received no greater amount
for the production. Under such circumstances, the binding-untilrevoked rule would remain as a complete shield from liability for
payments made pursuant to unrevoked division orders.
Questions about the application of the binding-until-revoked
rule and the Gavenda exception are likely to arise in cases contesting the deduction of post-production costs, such as Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank.15 In particular, if a division order
Order: Legal and Practical Aspects, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997). He
concludes, however, that the distinction vanished after the decision in Heritage Resources,
Inc. v. NationsBank, a case which is discussed infra at Part II.C.6.
113. See 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACOUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND
GAS § 6.5, at 301-0 to 301-1 (1996) (noting that courts have distinguished Middleton on
basis that lessees never actually benefited from higher market prices). Similarly, in Chicago Corp. v. Wall, 156 Tex. 217, 293 S.W.2d 844 (1956), relied upon in Middleton and
distinguished in Gavenda, the operators paid out the correct total amount of royalty owed,
but, in doing so, overpaid some royalty owners and underpaid others. Wall, 293 S.W.2d at
846-47.
114. This apparently depicts what occurred in Cabot. See Cabot, 754 S.W.2d at 111
(Kilgarlin, J., dissenting) (protesting unfairness of lessee receiving higher intrastate market
price but paying royalties on lower interstate market price); see also supra note 103 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Kilgarlin's dissenting opinion).
115. 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 537 (Apr. 25, 1996).
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permits deductions from the lessor's royalty but the lease royalty
clause does not, then Gavenda would apply if the lessee has retained monies which the lease required to be paid to the royalty
owner. It must be remembered, however, that the Gavenda exception limits the lessee's liability for past payments under an unre116
voked division order to amounts the lessee has actually retained.
In summary, while producers lamented the Gavenda decision for
having eroded the protections of the binding-until-invoked rule,
even the progenitor of that rule, the Middleton decision, acknowledged the need to protect royalty owners against unfair use of the
division order to detract from their rights under the lease royalty
clause. Because Gavenda has been a part of Texas law for over ten
years, it is more instructive to analyze its likely application to future cases than to hope for its eventual demise. The foregoing
analysis of the Gavenda exception suggests that courts might apply
it not only to Gavenda settings involving a discrepancy in the size
of a payee's interest, but to other situations in which a lessee has
been unjustly enriched. One example is disputes in which royalty
owners allege that division-order terms conflict with the lease royalty clause regarding the deduction of post-production costs. A recent Texas case, Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank,"17 has
raised this exact issue.
C. Division-OrderDisputes Involving the Deduction of PostProduction Costs-Heritage Resources, Inc. v.
NationsBank
The court of appeals and supreme court opinions in HeritageResources, Inc. v. NationsBank provide a paradigm for assessing the
scope of the Gavenda exception, and, more generally, for analyzing
the interaction of the lease royalty clause and the division order in
royalty-payment disputes between lessors and their lessees. 18
These opinions are pertinent to future division-order disputes, not
only because of the ultimate result, but also because of the lessons
116. See discussion infra Part II.C.2. (concluding that appellate court in Heritage Re.
sources erred on this point).
117. 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 537 (Apr. 25, 1996).
118. This section focuses on division orders sent to lessors by their lessees. The effect
of division orders between lessors and third-party purchasers on the lessees' liability is
discussed infra at Part III.E.
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that can be learned from the analytical errors both courts
committed.
1. The Framework for Resolving Division-Order Disputes
Reduced to their basics, the cases preceding Heritage Resources

suggest a general framework for resolving royalty payment disputes between lessors and lessees that involve division orders. To
begin with, courts must interpret both the lease royalty clause and
the division order. This process inevitably entails application of
well-known rules of interpretation that, although easy to recite, do
not produce predictable results. 119 If a court determines that no
conflict exists, the next question is whether the royalty require-

ments have been breached, rendering the lessee liable. 120 If, however, a court determines that the division order does conflict with
the lease royalty provisions, then the binding-until-revoked rule
shields the lessee from liability in regard to all past underpayments,
unless the Gavenda exception applies. If Gavenda applies, the

lessee is still liable for past underpayments, but only to the extent it
retained royalty and was unjustly enriched.
Additionally, in applying this general framework, Texas courts
and practitioners must determine the applicability of certain statutory provisions. The Texas legislature enacted a statute in 1983
12 1
governing a payor's liability for improper payment of royalties,
which was amended in 1991 to include provisions addressing division orders. But the 1991 provisions have prospective application
only. 1 22 The statutory aspect of this framework for resolving divi119. See Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and
Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction,24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1993)
(noting that interpretive rules "'are merely statements of judicial preference for the resolution of a particular problem,"' and recognizing that "when abused, the battle of the 'canons' replaces rational thought and common sense and leads to obfuscation and
uncertainty") (internal citations omitted); see also Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine in Texas Deed Construction, 34 S. TEX. L.J. 74, 76-80
(1993) (reviewing rules of construction for document interpretation and recognizing
"amorphous nature" of these rules).
120. If payment is not made as required in the division order, then the binding-untilrevoked rule would be inapplicable. 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER,
TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 6.5, at 301 (1996).
121. Act of May 24, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 228, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 966 (codified
as amended at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 91.401-91.406 (Vernon 1993 & Supp. 1997)).
122. Act of June 16, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 650, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2392; see infra
Part III (discussing Texas division order statute and 1991 amendments).

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:353

sion-order disputes is described in detail in Part III. First, however,
the Heritage Resources opinions are discussed in light of the foregoing framework.
2. The Court of Appeals Opinion in Heritage Resources
In Heritage Resources, NationsBank, as trustee for several inter-

est owners, brought suit in 1989 against the lessee, Heritage, claiming that Heritage had improperly deducted post-production
transportation costs from royalty payments. 123 The trial court entered a judgment awarding the bank damages for the transportation deductions, plus interest and attorney fees. 124 On appeal,
Heritage claimed that the trial court had misinterpreted the royalty
clause as prohibiting the deduction of transportation costs. 125 Heritage also claimed that even if that interpretation were correct, the
division orders expressly permitted those deductions
and, under
1 26
the Middleton rule, were binding until revoked.
In resolving the dispute, the court of appeals dutifully undertook

the first step in the framework outlined above: interpretation of
the three different lease clauses and the division orders. 2 7 Each of
the three clauses required the lessee to pay the lessor a fraction "of
123. Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 895 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex. App.-E1
Paso 1995), rev'd, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 537 (Apr. 25, 1996). Bank personnel noticed the
problem in January 1989 and sought recovery of the amounts deducted from royalty payments since 1985. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 835-37, 838. The three lease clauses at issue read:
3. The royalties to be paid Lessor are...
(b) on gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous substances produced from the
land, or land consolidated therewith, and sold or used off the premises or in the manufacture of gasoline or other products therefrom, the market value at the well of 1/5 of
the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the well the royalty shall be 1/5 of
the amount realized from such sale provided, however, that there shall be no deductions from the value of Lessor's royalty by reason of any required processing, cost of
dehydration, compression, transportationor other matter to market such gas.
Or:
3. In consideration of the premises, Lessee covenants and agrees ...
(b) To pay the Lessor 1/4 of the market value at the well for all gas.., produced from
the leased premises and sold by Lessee or used off the leased premises; provided,
however, that there shall be no deductionsfrom the value of Lessor's royalty by reason
of any required processing, cost of dehydration, compression, transportation,or other
matter to market such gas.
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the market value at the well [for gas]

. . .

provided, however, that

there shall be no deductions from the value of Lessor's royalty by
reason of any required processing, cost of dehydration, compres128
sion, transportation or other matter to market such gas.'
Heritage argued that this language should be interpreted to permit the transportation cost deductions on the theory that the
phrase "the value of the Lessor's royalty" was equivalent to the
"market value at the well.' 1 29 The "market value at the well" standard, according to Heritage, inherently permits the deduction of
post-production costs, such as those incurred in transporting the
gas. 130 Therefore, Heritage asserted, the royalty clauses should be
interpreted to mean that the lessee could deduct no more than the

reasonable costs permitted under the "market value at the well"
3
standard.1 '

In considering Heritage's argument, the court invoked a familiar
litany of rules of interpretation. The court, for instance, noted that

its goal generally is to determine the intent of the parties as expressed in the contested instrument. 32 Here, because neither
party had claimed ambiguity in the lease, the court recognized that
the plain language of the lease would control without resort to ex33

trinsic evidence.

Or:
3. Lessee shall pay the following royalties subject to the following provisions: ...
(b) Lessee shall pay the Lessor 1/4 of the market value at the well for all gas...
produced ...and sold by Lessee or used off the leased premises . . .provided,
however, that there shall be no deductions from the value of Lessor's royalty by reason of any required processing, cost of dehydration, compression, transportation, or
other matter to market such gas.
Heritage, 895 S.W.2d at 835-36 (all emphasis in original).
Only the clause in the first lease has the traditional bifurcated gas clause containing the
two different standards, market value and amount realized. However, under the facts of
the case, the market value standard applied for that lease. See Heritage Resources, Inc. v.
NationsBank, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. 537, 538 (Apr. 25, 1996) (finding fact that first lease clause
was bifurcated to be irrelevant for purposes of resolving case).
128. Heritage, 895 S.W.2d at 835-36.
129. Id. at 836.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Heritage, 895 S.W.2d at 836.
133. Id. Ambiguity is a question of law for the court. Reilly v. Rangers Mgmt., Inc.,
727 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tex. 1987). The determination of ambiguity is made "by looking at
the contract as a whole in light of the circumstances existing at the time the contract was
entered into." Id. Extrinsic evidence is not permitted to determine ambiguity but, instead,
is permitted only to show how the language in the document should be interpreted. See
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In applying this "plain language" rule, the court first considered
the phrase "market value at the well. ' 134 Relying on a well-known
oil and gas treatise, 35 the court agreed with Heritage and con-

cluded that, as a general rule, the phrase contemplated the deduction of post-production costs from royalty, 36 but it noted that the

definition was "subject to modification by the parties.' 1 37 Ulti-

mately, the court of appeals found such a modification in language
in the lease clause providing that "there shall be no deductions
' 38
[for] ... transportation.'
The court of appeals in Heritage Resources also declared that it

should make "every attempt to harmonize and give effect to 1all
39
provisions of the contract so that none is rendered meaningless.'
In rejecting Heritage's interpretation of the lease clauses, the court
relied heavily on this "harmonizing" homily,

40

which was also the

focus of another recent Supreme Court of Texas case, Luckel v.

White.' 4 ' Luckel involved a problem that has plagued Texas courts

for decades: the interpretation of mineral deeds with conflicting
fractions. 142 In Luckel, the court overruled a previous Texas
Kelly v. Marlin, 714 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Tex. 1986) (permitting extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances to assist court in determining sense in which words were used).
An instrument is ambiguous only when the application of rules of construction leaves it
unclear as to which meaning is the correct one. Prairie Producing Co. v. Schlachter, 786
S.W.2d 409, 413 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
Another recent Supreme Court of Texas case involving the deductibility issue and division orders, Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co., 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. 533 (Apr. 25, 1996), found one
of the division orders at issue to be ambiguous. See discussion infra Part II.C.4. (addressing Judice decision).
134. Heritage, 895 S.W.2d at 836.
135. Id. (citing 3 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES L. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW
§ 645.2, at 598). The appellee had not questioned this interpretation of the phrase as being
correct under Texas law. See Appellee's Brief at 8, Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 895 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995) (No.08-94-00062-CV), rev'd, 39 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 537 (Apr. 25, 1996).
136. Heritage, 895 S.W.2d at 836-37.
137. Id. at 836.
138. See id. at 837 (concluding "that the parties intended the gas royalty payments to
be free from costs of 'any required processing, cost of dehydration, compression, transportation or other matter to market such gas'").
139. Id. at 836.
140. See Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and
Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1, 72-80
(1993) (describing basic "harmonizing" canon and its development).
141. 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991).
142. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 461. Several authors have addressed the problems associated with courts interpreting mineral deeds with conflicting fractions. E.g., Laura H. Bur-
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Supreme Court case, Alford v. Krum,143 which had become infamous for its adoption of the "granting clause prevails" rule. The
Luckel court rejected the use of "the granting clause prevails" rule

because of its failure to give weight to all the language in the document as required by the primary tenet of deed construction, the

"four-corners" rule.'"
In Heritage Resources, the court of appeals' interpretation of the

lease clause, unlike the lessee's theory, complied with the harmonizing canon outlined in Luckel. As the Heritage Resources court
noted, the lessee's interpretation would render meaningless much

of the language in the royalty clauses, but the bank's interpretation

"allows all provisions to be harmonized, giving meaning to

each.' 1 45 Specifically, the bank's view provided the greater harmony "because gas royalty payments are usually subject to post-

production costs; [and] if the royalty provisions at issue here did
not contain the language excluding post-production costs, there
would be no issue because the accepted definition of royalty interest . . would control." 46

Having completed the first part of the framework for resolving
division-order disputes by interpreting the royalty clause, the court
of appeals then turned to the division orders. The division orders

in question, like those in the "market value royalty" cases, needed
no interpretation regarding deductions. They clearly contradicted
the lease royalty clause (at least under the interpretation adopted
by the appellate court) by expressly permitting the deduction of

post-production transportation costs. 147 This contradiction raised

ney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine in Texas Deed Construction, 34 S.
TEx. L.J. 74, 97-101 (1993); Tevis Herd, Deed Construction and the "Repugnant to the
Grant" Doctrine, 21 TEx. TECH L. REV. 635 (1990); Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task
of InterpretingMineral Deeds and Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction,24
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 19-43 (1993).
143. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984).
144. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 464. The court held that "the majority in Alford incorrectly failed to harmonize the provisions under the four corners rule and then erred in
applying the 'repugnant to the grant rule' in disregard of the future lease clause." Id.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Texas reaffirmed that the four corners rule, and the harmonizing canon, apply to resolve the conflicting fraction issue. Concord Oil Co. v.
Pennzoil Producing Co., 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 33 (Oct. 19, 1996), mtn. for reh'gpending.
145. Heritage, 895 S.W.2d at 837.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 838. The division orders at issue contained the following language:
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the perennial question in division-order disputes: what is the effect
of the division order on the lease royalty clause?
In answering this question, the court initially recited Middleton
and acknowledged the binding-until-revoked rule, 48 but it then
proceeded immediately to invoke the Gavenda exception. 149 By invoking the exception, the court of appeals faltered on several issues. First, the court misapplied the unjust enrichment criterion of

the Gavenda exception. Second, the court failed to analyze satisfactorily the effect of two additional clauses in the division orders.
One of these clauses, referred to herein as the "no amendments"
clause, should have rendered application of Gavenda irrelevant.
The other clause, referred to as the "no liability" clause, should
have been analyzed in light of the "no amendments" clause rather
than under the precepts of the Gavenda exception. Each of these
errors is discussed below.
a.

Application of the Gavenda Exception

The court of appeals gave two reasons for disagreeing with Heritage's claim that the division orders were binding until revoked. 150

One reason was based upon the Gavenda exception. 151 In applying
that exception, the court did not evaluate the "erroneous" divisionorder criterion to determine whether it should be applied to errors
other than those affecting the size of the parties' interest, as in
Gavenda. Instead, it simply applied the exception because there
All proceeds from the sale of gas shall be paid to the undersigned or their assigns in
the proportions as herein set out less taxes and any costs incurred in the handling and
transportationto the point of sale, treating, compressing, boosting, dehydrating, or any
other conditioning necessary, subject to the terms of any contract of purchase and sale
which affects the above described property.
Id.

148. Id. Interestingly, although the court relied on Middleton, it referred to division
orders as "contracts." Id. However, the Middleton court apparently rejected that theoretical basis. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 249-51 (Tex. 1981).
149. Heritage, 895 S.W.2d at 838-39.
150. Id.

151. See id. at 839 (concluding that "Heritage benefitted from the erroneous division
orders, thus rendering them non-binding upon the royalty owners"). The other reason for
the appellate court's refusal to apply the binding-until-revoked rule stemmed from conflicting evidence regarding the intended meaning of the division order language. See id. at
838-39 (asserting that "there is evidence within the division orders themselves that the
parties intended to continue relying upon the leases, with its [sic] understanding that transportation costs would not be deducted from royalties, nor would royalty owners have their
legal remedies curtailed").
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was evidence that "Heritage profited from error in the division orders. ' 152 Specifically, the evidence showed that Heritage had contracted with the Urantia Corporation, the gas purchaser, to
transport the gas from the well-head to the pipeline, and that the
president and sole shareholder of Heritage was also the majority
owner of Urantia. 153 Based on this evidence, the court determined
that Heritage was liable for all transportation costs paid to Urantia
54
that had been deducted from the bank's royalties.1
As noted above, the Gavenda and Middleton decisions likely

warrant application of the exception to the binding-until-revoked
rule to disputes regarding the deduction of post-production

costs. 155 However, the Heritage Resources court's application of
the exception went beyond the Gavenda holding. Gavenda

shielded the lessee from liability for payments made pursuant to an
unrevoked division order except for amounts actually retained by
the lessee. 56 On this basis, Heritage Resources is distinguishable

because it involved interest owners, other than Heritage, who actually benefited from the deduction of transportation charges from
the royalties paid to the bank.157 Although Heritage operated each
of the wells located on the leases, it owned varying percentages of
the working interest in those leases.' 58 Therefore, Heritage bene-

fited only to the extent to which it would have been liable for the
transportation costs proportionate to the size of its working
interests.
The court of appeals, however, did not rely on Heritage's liability as a working-interest owner. Instead, the court stressed that the
152. Id. at 839.
153. Id.
154. Heritage, 895 S.W.2d at 839.
155. See discussion supra Part II.B.
156. Gavenda, 705 S.W.2d at 693.
157. See Heritage, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 540 (recognizing that "there were other working interest owners who were not parties to the suit" and who "would benefit from an
improper deduction of transportation charges from the royalties paid to NationsBank").
In its brief, Appellant explained that in some of the leases involved in the dispute, Heritage
owned no interest in the producing wells. Brief of Appellant Heritage Resources, Inc. at
29, Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 895 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995)
(No.08-94-00062-CV), rev'd, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 537 (Apr. 25, 1996). For those wells, Heritage would not have received any money for production.
158. Brief of Appellant Heritage Resources, Inc. at 7, Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 895 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995) (No. 08-94-00062-CV), rev'd, 39
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 537 (Apr. 25, 1996).
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president and sole shareholder of Heritage, the lessee, was also the
majority owner of Urantia, the gas transporter. Although the court
did not develop this "piercing the corporate veil" theory further, it
apparently concluded that Heritage had been unjustly enriched by
essentially receiving Urantia's payments for the transportation due
to the companies' common ownership. But the real issue was not
whether the gas transporter Urantia was entitled to the payments;
in fact, the parties had agreed that the charges for the transportation were reasonable. 159 Rather, the question the court should
have analyzed was who-the royalty owners or the lessees-should
have been required to pay for the transportation costs. Because
the division orders placed that burden on the royalty owners, not
the lessee, in contradiction to the lease royalty clause, Middleton
and Gavenda came into play. Under the Gavenda exception, Heritage should have been liable only to the extent to which it had been
unjustly enriched as a lessee. Therefore, by ignoring the corporate
distinctions, the court went too far in finding that the payments to
the gas transporter Urantia had unjustly enriched the lessee
Heritage.
In summary, under its interpretation of the lease royalty clause,
and assuming that the division order did not contain the "no
amendments" clause discussed below, the court of appeals erred by
holding Heritage liable for all of the improperly deducted transportation costs. Under a proper application of the Gavenda exception,
Heritage would have been liable only to the extent to which it had
actually retained monies that should have been paid to the royalty
owners. As described below, however, the court of appeals should
not have applied Gavenda in this case, but, should have employed
a different analysis.
b.

The "No Amendments" Clause

In addition to the clause regarding the deduction of post-production costs, the Heritage Resources division order contained another
159. Heritage,895 S.W.2d at 838-39. Nor was there any question whether the transaction between Urantia and Heritage was a sham. That question becomes relevant under the
implied covenant of marketing, which was not alleged as a basis for recovery in Heritage
Resources. Moreover, even when a lessor claims there has been a breach of the implied
covenant of marketing, the fact that a subsidiary is wholly owned by a parent does not
constitute a per se breach of the covenant. Parker v. TXO Prod. Corp., 716 S.W.2d 644,
646-47 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
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clause that is commonly inserted because of the Middleton deci-

sion. That additional clause provided that: "[D]espite anything
stated herein to the contrary, the execution of this instrument is
not intended to alter or amend the Lease or any amendment
thereto pertaining covering our [the royalty owners'] interest or interests shown on this instrument."' 6 This type of provision logically may be referred to as a "no amendments" clause.

The question in the interpretation process is: how does this "no
amendments" clause change the effect of the division order on the
lease royalty clause? The familiar litany of rules applies in interpreting the lease royalty clause: The language of the "no amendments" clause must be harmonized with other language in the
division order, with a goal of ascertaining the intent of the parties
as expressed within the instrument. Thus, instead of relying primarily on Gavenda and its unjust enrichment criterion, the court
should have attempted to "harmonize" the clauses. 16 The first line
of the "no amendments" clause explicitly provided that, regardless
of other language in the division order, none of the order's language should be interpreted as amending the lease. 162 This language of the "no amendments" clause should have negated the
prior division order clause which expressly permitted the lessee to
deduct costs. Under this interpretation of the "no amendments"
clause, the division order never permitted the lessee to deduct
transportation costs, rendering Middleton and Gavenda irrelevant. 63 Instead, the terms of the lease royalty clause governed the
160. Heritage,895 S.W.2d at 838.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. In its reply to NationBank's motion for rehearing, Heritage argued that the "no
amendments" clause should not be interpreted as permanently amending the lease royalty
clause. Reply of Petitioner to Respondents' Motion for Rehearing at 11-12, Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 537 (Apr. 25, 1996) (No. 95-0515). Instead, Heritage claimed that the clause should continue to shield the lessee from liability
for past underpayments under Middleton, or, at least, limit their liability under Gavenda.
Id. Absent the "no amendments" clause, Heritage would be correct in asserting that Middleton and Gavenda applied. As a matter of interpretation and as a matter of policy, however, Heritage's interpretation of the "no amendments" clause should be rejected.
Contrary to the four corners rule, which requires giving effect to all language in a document, Heritage's interpretation of the clause ignores the initial admonition that the division order does not amend the lease "despite anything stated herein to the contrary." On
its face, that language negates the contradictory language in the division order permitting
deductions. In contrast, Heritage's interpretation views the clause as merely restating Mid-
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lessee's royalty obligation. Thus, a correct reading of the "no
amendments" clause would have rendered the lessee liable for
164
breaching the lease.
c. The "No Liability" Clause
In addition to the "no amendments" clause, the division order in
Heritage Resources contained another clause purporting to limit
Heritage's liability as operator:
In the event the undersigned is not paid to the full amount for his
division of interest of the proceeds derived from the sale of gas and
condensate, the undersigned shall have no legal action against Operator but, instead, the undersigned shall have as its sole legal remedy
against those division of interest owners who were paid in excess of
the amount such an interest owner should have received from the
proceeds of the sale of such gas and condensate. 65
Heritage relied on the above clause in its attempt to avoid liability
for the total amount of underpayments caused by the deduction of
the transportation costs from the bank's royalties. 166 The court
concluded, however, that the "no liability" clause was ineffectual,167 unfortunately repeating a prior judicial mistake. As previously discussed, the court of appeals ignored the "no amendments"
clause and misapplied the Gavenda exception to avoid Middleton's
binding-until-revoked rule regarding the transportation cost deductions. Similarly, the court reasoned that Gavenda also rendered
the "no liability" clause nonbinding and ineffective. 68 Middleton
and Gavenda, however, should have been irrelevant to the court's
analysis in each instance. Under the "no amendments" clause, the
dleton, and rewrites it to read "although this division order does not permanently amend
the lease, it is nevertheless binding until revoked."
Heritage's position should also be rejected as a matter of policy. The "no amendments"
clause likely lulled the royalty owners into a sense of security about whether they sacrificed
their rights under their leases by signing the division orders. Those expectations should be
respected. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 251 n.8 (recognizing that division orders are not binding when they would "prevent relief from fraud, accident or mistake or preclude the correction of mathematical calculations").
164. See 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND
GAS § 4.6[D], at 195-0 (1996) (explaining that breach of gas lease equates to breach of
contract).
165. Heritage, 895 S.W.2d at 839.
166. Id. at 838.
167. Id. at 839.
168. Id. at 838.
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division order should not have been interpreted to amend the lease
clause regarding deductions. Similarly, the court failed to interpret
the "no liability" clause in light of the effects of the "no amendments" clause. Therefore, the only question for the court should
have been whether the "no liability" clause factually amended the
lease in contradiction to the "no amendments" clause.
Heritage argued in its briefs that the "no amendments" clause
did not prevent enforcement of the "no liability" clause, because
the latter did not factually amend the lease. 69 Such an interpretation is questionable, however, because it ignores the lessee's contractual liability to pay royalties as established in the lease. The
court of appeals found on this issue that the leases required Heritage to pay royalties without deductions for post-production
costs.' 70 Therefore, unless the lease itself partially released Heritage from that liability, 71 it should have been liable for the total
amount of deductions sought by the royalty owners under the
terms of the division order and its "no amendments" clause.
A strict interpretation of the division order, similar to the ap17
proach used by the court in Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell, 1
also undermines Heritage's position on the "no liability" clause.
Recall that in Terrell the court concluded that language in the division order regarding the deduction of taxes affected the lessee only
in its capacity as purchaser. 73 Similarly, the "no liability" clause in
Heritage Resources provides that the royalty owners shall have no
legal action against the "operator.' 74 Under Terrell's strict interpretation approach, that specific language should not be inter169. Reply of Petitioner to Respondents' Motion for Rehearing at 11-12, Heritage
Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 39 Tex. S.Ct. J. 537 (Apr. 25, 1996) (No. 95-0515).
170. Heritage, 895 S.W.2d at 839.
171. For example, a clause absolving a lessee of liability after an assignment of its
interest could have altered Heritage's liability. Although such clauses are typical in oil and
gas leases, the opinion does not address the effect of other lease clauses on Heritages's
liability. In Williams v. Baker Exploration Co., the court found the lessee liable when an
oil purchaser failed to pay the lessor. Williams v. Baker Exploration Co., 767 S.W.2d 193,
196 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, writ denied). Although the lessor had signed the third-party
purchaser's division order, the court found the lessee liable for all royalties. Id. However,
the court noted that the lessee could have relied on a clause in the lease that absolved it of
liabilities after assigning its interest. Id.; see infra Part III.E.1. (discussing Williams
further).
172. 183 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd).
173. See supra Part II.B. (discussing Terrell).
174. Heritage, 895 S.W.2d at 839.
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preted to affect Heritage's liability as a "lessee." Through strict
interpretation, the court also could find the remaining portion of
the "no liability" clause inapplicable since it requires royalty owners to recover against overpaid "division of interest owners," while
the facts in Heritage Resources did not involve any overpayments
to such owners.
The "no liability" clause in Heritage Resources appears to be
geared toward the lessee or operator who pays out the correct total
amount of royalty required by a lease, but distributes it incorrectly
among the interest owners. Requiring the underpaid owner in that
situation to seek recovery only against the overpaid owners is consistent with prior law. 175 In Heritage Resources, however, the
lessee failed to pay out the correct total amount of royalties,
thereby violating its lease obligations. Accordingly, the "no liabilities" clause could not have limited Heritage's liability.
In summary, the court of appeals properly proceeded through
the general framework for resolving division-order disputes. First,
the court interpreted the lease royalty clauses and the division orders. Then, having determined there was a conflict between the
division order and the royalty clause, it considered the effect of
Middleton's binding-until-revoked rule and the exception to that
rule created in Gavenda. At this point, however, the court erred in
its application of Gavenda by overextending the unjust enrichment
criterion. In addition, in interpreting the division order, the court
failed adequately to analyze the "no amendments" and the "no liability" clauses. Yet, despite these errors, the court still managed to
reach the required result, at least under its interpretation of the
lease royalty clause.
Unfortunately, the common law rules for interpretation of documents are notoriously malleable.1 76 As a result, in most document
175. See Chicago Corp. v. Wall, 293 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1956) (denying recovery for
underpayment of royalties when operator acted in good faith by paying royalties pursuant
to binding division order).
176. See JOH N D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRAcrs § 3-16,
at 177 (3d ed. 1987) (recognizing that courts often use common law interpretation rules to
justify desired policy results). The authors opine that:
[Tihere is no unanimity as to the content of the parol evidence rule or the process
called interpretation .... It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the courts
follow any of these rules blindly, literally or consistently. As often as not they choose
the standard or the rule that they think will give rise to a just result in the particular

case. We have also seen that often under a guise of interpretation a court will actually
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interpretation cases, the opposing parties claim that the language is
unambiguous and recite the same litany of interpretive rules; 177 yet
each party then offers contradictory conclusions about the meanings of the words. 178 Heritage Resources illustrates this phenomenon, not only with the parties' arguments, but also with the
supreme court's opinion, which ultimately reversed the court of appeals' interpretation of the lease royalty clause.
3.

The Supreme Court Opinion in Heritage Resources

True to the framework outlined above, the supreme court began
with the lease royalty clause in resolving the Heritage Resources

dispute. 79 In the end, its interpretation reversed the court of appeals' decision and rendered moot any discussion of the effect of
division orders on the lease royalty clause. 80 Nonetheless, the jus-

tice writing for the majority opted to express his opinion, in obiter
dicta, on the appellate court's application of Gavenda.18'
Rather than being regarded as a decision having significant im-

pact on the law of division orders, the supreme court's opinion in
Heritage Resources likely will be known for firmly adopting a definition of the "market value at the well" royalty standard. In so

doing, the supreme court's majority opinion concluded that the
phrase inherently permits the deduction of post-production costs
enforce its notions of 'public policy' which is nothing more than an attempt to do
justice.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Several authors have examined these common law rules
for interpretation. See generally Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting
Mineral Deeds and Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH L.
REv. 1 (1993); Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine in
Texas Deed Construction, 34 S. TEX. L.J. 74, 76-81 (1993).
177. See Criswell v. European Crossroads Shopping Ctr., Ltd., 792 S.W.2d 945, 950
(Tex. 1990) (Gonzalez, J,, dissenting) (writing, "I find it odd that all parties to this dispute,
the trial court, the court of appeals, and this court agree that the contract in question is
clear as a bell and yet disagree as to its meaning."); see also Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrinein Texas Deed Construction,34 S. TEX. L. REv. 73,
80 (1993) (stating that "[a] preferable alternative to struggling with the amorphous nature
of the rules recited in the interpretation process is to adopt fact-specific rules for construction of particular problems").
178. See Heritage, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. at 548-49 (Gonzalez J., dissenting) (musing that
majority and concurrence reached opposite results despite agreeing that lease in question
was unambiguous).
179. Id. at 537-38.
180. Id. at 540-41.
181. Id-at 540.
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from royalty. 182 Only a concurring opinion expressed doubt
183
whether the phrase had achieved such clarity under Texas law,

and just two dissenting justices suggested that the phrase previously had not been determined184unequivocally to include the deduction of post-production costs.
The majority's decision that the term "market value at the well"
permitted the deduction of post-production costs seems sound,
although not entirely beyond question. As noted by the concur-

rence, many of the earlier cases placing the burden of such costs on
the lessor turned largely on the specific language of the lease at
issue.185 For example, in Martin v. Glass,'1 86 relied upon by the majority, the lease provided for "net proceeds," a term that more
clearly contemplated post-production deductions.1 87 The majority
likewise relied upon Skaggs v. Heard,8 8 in which the court had

found the phrase "at the well" ambiguous because the lease contained no express language about charging post-production ex1 89
penses to the royalty owner.
Despite the Martin and Skaggs decisions, many other cases support the Heritage Resources majority's conclusion, 190 including

182. Id. at 539-40.
183. See Heritage, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 541-46 (Owen, J., concurring) (evaluating
inconsistencies in determining meaning of market value).
184. See id. at 549 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (stressing that "this Court has never decided previously whether market value at the well includes or excludes post-production
costs ... and lower courts have not reached agreement on the issue") (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
185. Id. at 543-44 (Owen, J., concurring)
186. 571 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Tex. 1983), affd, 736 F.2d 1524 (5th Cir. 1994).
187. Martin, 571 F. Supp. at 1410.
188. 172 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
189. Skaggs, 172 F. Supp. at 815-16.
190. See Martin, 571 F. Supp. at 1410-11 (permitting deduction of post-production
compression charges based on net proceeds 'at the well'); Parker v. TXO Prod. Corp., 716
S.W.2d 644, 648 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ) (recognizing that all post-production costs can be charged to royalty owners); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen,
683 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984) (evaluating 'market value at the well' as
market value of gas where sold, less reasonable and necessary transportation and processing costs), affd in part, rev'd in part, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140 (Dec. 16, 1987), withdrawn, set
aside, dism'd as moot, 760 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. 1988); Le Cuno Oil Co. v. Smith, 306 S.W.2d
190, 193 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (allowing for deductibility of
post-production costs from gross sales price received under division order calling for royalty 'at the well'), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 974 (1958).
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Middleton and Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co. 191
Those cases instruct about determining market value:
[T]he point is to determine the price a reasonable buyer would have
paid for the gas at the well when produced. Comparable sales of gas
at other wells may be used to do this. Another method is to use sales
of processed gas and deduct processing costs. Yet another relevant
measure is ...the actual sale price of the gas less costs."9
In order to properly reflect value "at the well when produced,"
each of the above methods would require deducting transportation
costs from sales away from the well-head to determine the value of
the lessor's royalty. Consequently, each method appears to recogdeductions
nize the propriety of allowing post-production '1cost
93
when determining the "market value at the well.'
Even prior to the Supreme Court of Texas's decision in Heritage
Resources, the high courts in other jurisdictions had labeled Texas
as following the rule of charging royalty owners with their proportionate share of post-production expenses, including those for
transportation. Recently, for example, in Sternberger v. Marathon
Oil Co., 1 9 4 the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that "the law in
Texas is well established [that] ...[p]ost-production expenses are
borne proportionately by the lessor and the lessee, while the lessee
alone bears the costs of production.' ' 195 Because "the costs of
transporting a marketable product to a distant market are postproduction expenses," the Kansas court concluded that "transpor196
tation costs are deductible from royalties under Texas law."'
191. 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985).
192. Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 238-39. Along the same lines, Middleton lists comparable sales as "those comparable in time, quality, quantity, and availability of marketing outlets." Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 246; see also David E. Pierce, Royalty Calculation in a
Restructured Gas Market, 13 E. MIN. L. FOUND. § 18.03[4][a], at 18-24 (1992) (indicating
that costs of transportation likely would be deducted from sales at different points on pipeline to render them "comparable").
193. See generally Owen L. Anderson, The Gas Royalty Obligation: Is Royalty Ordinarily Payable on the "Raw" Gas at the Mouth of the Well or on "Marketable" Gas?, 37
NAT. RESOURCES J. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal) (providing thorough discussion of post-production cost issue).
194. 894 P.2d 788 (Kan. 1995).
195. Sternberger,894 P.2d at 805.
196. Id.; see also Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 657 (Colo. 1994) (recognizing
Texas as having adopted rule that "nonoperating interests must bear their proportionate
share of costs incurred after gas is severed at the wellhead"); Wood v. TXO Prod. Corp.,
854 P.2d 880, 882 (Okla. 1992) (describing Texas as allowing deduction of compression
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Although prior Texas cases were not without contradictions, one
could have predicted that the Supreme Court of Texas would expressly adopt the rule other jurisdictions assumed was already in
place. In fact, even the opposing parties in Heritage Resources accepted the court's definition of "market value at the well.' 1 97 Thus,
given the state of the law, the Heritage Resources opinion articulated a rule that had been "clearly foreshadowed," justifying the
retroactive application of its interpretation of "market value at the
98
well."1'
Having interpreted the "market value at the well" standard in
the Heritage Resources leases, the supreme court was next faced
with interpreting the "no deductions" language in the lease royalty
clause, which provided: "there shall be no deductions from the
value of Lessor's royalty by reason of any required processing, cost
of dehydration, compression, transportation, or other matter to
market such gas."' 199 In this interpretive effort, the court primarily
focused on the phrase "the value of Lessor's royalty, 21 00° and ultimately adopted Heritage's argument that the "value of the lessor's
royalty" equaled the "market value at the well." This interpreta20
tion allowed the deduction of necessary transportation costs. '
Because the bank conceded that transportation costs were reasonable, the court concluded there' 202had not been a deduction from the
"value of the lessor's royalty.

costs from royalty interest). For a thorough examination of the Kansas, Colorado, and
Oklahoma cases, see generally Owen L. Anderson, The Gas Royalty Obligation: Is Royalty
Ordinarily Payable on the "Raw" Gas at the Mouth of the Well or on "Marketable" Gas?, 37
NAT. RESOURCES J. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on file with the St. Mary's Law
Journal).
197. See Respondents' Motion for Rehearing at 6, Heritage Resources, Inc. v.
NationsBank, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 537 (Apr. 25, 1996) (No. 95-0515) (stating that "NationsBank does not challenge the Court's opinion" that royalty interests clearly are subject to
post-production costs unless otherwise agreed).
198. See Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.,
826 S.W.2d 489, 518-19 (Tex. 1992) (comparing retroactive versus prospective rulings).
The dissent in Heritage Resources argued that the majority erred in applying its holding
retroactively. Heritage, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.at 549 (Gonzales, J., dissenting).
199. Heritage,39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 538. The court referred to this clause as the "postproduction clause." Id. at 539. In the present discussion, however, I have labeled this
language as the "no deductions" clause.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 539-40.
202. Id. at 540.
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The Heritage Resources majority's interpretation of the lease
royalty clause has several flaws. First, the court contradicted the
very rules of construction it recited. For example, the court noted
the presumption that parties intend "every clause to have some effect, 2 °3 but then held that the "no deductions" phrase in the lease
was "surplusage as a matter of law. '' 204 Such an interpretation blatantly contradicts the Luckel decision, discussed earlier, wherein
the court disapproved of the Alford granting-clause-prevails rule
because that rule failed to give meaning to all language in the document.20 5 Unfortunately, the approach used in Heritage Resources
represents a regression to the intent-defeating rule of interpretation rejected earlier by the court in Luckel.
Second, the HeritageResources court failed to appreciate the implications of its own pronouncement that Texas long had followed
the rule that royalty owners bear their proportionate share of postproduction costs. Because that rule was well established, royalty
owners assumed its application unless the lease royalty clause expressly shifted that burden. Ideally, royalty owners would prefer to
shift the burden for these costs to the lessee in order to deflate the
lessees' incentive to inflate post-production costs, 20 6 a goal the "no
deduction" language in the HeritageResources lease was obviously
intended to accomplish.20 7
Third, both the Heritage Resources majority and the concurring
opinions incorrectly interpreted "market value at the well" as indicating where to establish the value of production. That approach
contradicts the Middleton and Piney Woods decisions, which had
interpreted the phrase as instructing how the value of the lessor's
203. Id at 538.
204. Heritage, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 538, 540.
205. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
206. See Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 661 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (emphasizing that when "processing costs enhance the value of an already marketable product the
burden should be placed upon the lessee to show such costs are reasonable, and that actual
royalty revenues increase in proportion with the costs assessed against the nonworking
interest"). The realization that many lessees would succumb to this temptation explains
why many jurisdictions place the burden of post-production costs on the lessee under the
implied marketing covenant.
207. Heritage, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 548 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). After quoting the
language of the leases' "no deductions" provisions, Justice Gonzalez questioned: "What
could be more clear? This provision expresses the parties' intent in plain English, and I am
puzzled by the court's decision to ignore the unequivocal intent of sophisticated parties
who negotiated contractual terms at arm's length." Id.

ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:353

royalty should be calculated.0 8 This contradiction is evident in the
supreme court's characterization of the court of appeals' interpretation of the "no deductions" language. The majority, joined by
the concurring justices, concluded that the "court of appeals erred
in holding that the lease required Heritage to pay royalties based
on the market value at the point of sale.120 9 But the appellate court
had not held that royalties were to be paid on the value at the point
of sale, but instead, had simply held that if the value at the point of
sale was used to calculate the royalty, then the express language in
the lease prohibited the lessee from deducting any costs from that
amount. Therefore, the court of appeals' opinion, unlike the
supreme court's, properly viewed the "no deductions" language in
the Heritage leases as instructing how, not where, to calculate the
value of the lessors' royalty.
The supreme court's majority and concurring opinions have created confusion about the interpretation of existing leases and the
drafting of new ones. Read narrowly, the opinions turn primarily
on the phrase "the value of the lessor's royalty" in the no-deductions clause. This narrow reading suggests that royalty owners with
other clauses, if worded differently, could escape the Heritage Resources interpretation. To avoid this confusion in future drafting,
practitioners could consider heeding the words of the concurring
opinion, which suggests using clauses stating that royalty would be
based on the market value at the "point of delivery or sale."21 0 In
today's new gas market, however, marked by deregulation, unbundled prices, and evolving roles for producers, processors, and transporters, even that phrase may be difficult to interpret and easy to
manipulate.

208. See Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 246-47 (describing how to calculate market value
based on comparable sales); Piney Woods, 726 F.2d at 238-39 (listing three methods by
which "market value at the well" may be calculated). The Piney Woods court clarified the
meaning of "market value at the well" as follows:
In determining market value at the well, the point is to determine the price a reasonable buyer would have paid for the gas at the well when produced. Comparable sales
of gas at other wells may be used to do this. Another method is to use sales of
processed gas and deduct processing costs. Yet another relevant measure is ... the
actual sale price of the gas less costs.
Id.
209. Heritage, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 540.
210. Id. at 547 (Owen, J., concurring).
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4.

The Effects of Heritage Resources on Future DivisionOrder Disputes-Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co.

The potential effects of the Heritage Resources decision on other
division-order disputes regarding deductions became obvious in a
decision the Supreme Court of Texas announced on the same day.
Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co.2 11 involved the allocation of post-production compression costs under the terms of certain leases and
division orders.21 2 The Judices were royalty owners under three oil
and gas leases, 213 and Mewbourne Oil Company was one of the
working-interest owners under those leases.214 The Judices asserted that Mewbourne had improperly deducted post-production
compression costs in calculating their royalty payments.215
Although all three leases were at issue, the lessee Mewbourne conceded that it could not deduct the charges from royalty payments
under one of those leases.216 The two remaining leases, however,
provided that royalties would be calculated as a fraction "of the
market value at the well of all gas produced, and saved from said
leased premises. "217 Rejecting the lower court's determination that
this phrase was ambiguous, the Judice court relied on Heritage Resources and held that this language entitled the lessee to charge the
Judices "their proportionate share of the reasonable cost of post' 218
production compression.

211. 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 533 (Apr. 25, 1996).
212. Judice, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 534.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. That lease royalty clause provided that:
Lessee shall pay to Lessor as royalty on gas, including casing head gas or other gaseous substances produced from said land and sold on or off the premises, 3/16 of the net
proceeds at the well received from the sale thereof, provided that on gas used off the
premises or by Lessee in the manufacture of gasoline or other products therefrom, the
royalty shall be the market value at the well of 3/16 of the gas so used; as to all gas sold
by Lessee under a written contract, the price received by Lessee for such gas shall be
conclusively presumed to be the net proceeds at the well or that market value at the well
for the gas so sold.
Id. at 534 n.1 (emphasis added).
Royalty owners should consider a phrase similar to the one italicized to insure that the
lessee bears the burden of post-production costs.
217. Judice, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 535.
218. Id.
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Next, the Judice court interpreted the division orders, two of
which provided that "[s]ettlement for gas sold shall be based on the
gross proceeds realized at the well by .. .[the Judices]. '2 19 The
court concluded that this phrase was ambiguous. 220 Again relying
on Heritage Resources, the court explained that "[t]here is an inherent conflict in the use of the two terms ['gross proceeds' and 'at
the well'] that renders the clause ambiguous." '2 '2 This finding of
ambiguity permitted the court to consider extrinsic evidence showing the parties had intended royalties to be based on the price received for the gas without deductions for compression.
In interpreting a third division order, however, the court determined that it unambiguously permitted the deductions.22 2 That division order provided that "[s]ettlement for gas sold shall be based
on the net proceeds realized at the well. ' 22 3 Originally, another
phrase expressly had permitted the deduction of costs incurred in
compressing, but the royalty owners had deleted that phrase by
hand.2 24 Nevertheless, the court held that "net proceeds" and "at
the well" expressly contemplated deductions and that the handwritten deletions did not alter the effect of those phrases. 2 5
Judice, then, incorporated the Heritage Resources definition of
"market value at the well" in interpreting the leases and division
orders. Additionally, Judice followed the precedent of earlier cases
that had interpreted the phrase "net proceeds" to permit post-production deductions. 2 6 Ironically, though, the Judice court reached
its decision despite evidence that the true intent of the parties was
to draft all of these documents to ensure that the lessee assumed
the burden of paying all post-production costs. 22 7 In other words,
the court's objective interpretation in Judice likely frustrated the
219. Id. (alteration in original).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Judice, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 536.
223. Id. at 535.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 536.
226. See Martin v. Glass, 571 F. Supp. 1406, 1415 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (recognizing "net
proceeds at the well" as allowing for deduction of post-production compression charges),
afftd, 736 F.2d 1524 (5th Cir. 1984).
227. This outside evidence of the parties' intent had influenced the appellate court's
decision. See Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co., 890 S.W.2d 180, 183-84 (Tex. App-Amarillo
1994), rev'd, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 533 (Apr. 25, 1996).
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parties' subjective intent. Nonetheless, the court's reading was
technically correct, because it is objective, and not subjective, intent that governs when a court interprets the terms of a written
instrument.2 s
5.

The Role of Gavenda in the Supreme Court's Judice and
Heritage Resources Decisions

The Gavenda exception becomes an issue only when a royalty
owner seeks to avoid Middleton's binding-until-revoked rule in order to recover for underpayments made while a division order was
in effect. In Judice, the court had no need to discuss Gavenda for
two reasons. First, the parties had agreed that the division orders
governed the payment of royalty until revoked by the filing of suit.
Second, the Judices had decided not to hold Mewbourne liable for
any benefit retained by Mewbourne when it paid royalties based
on the division orders.229 Similarly, the Heritage Resources court
had had no need to address Gavenda in light of the Heritage Resources court's questionable interpretation of the lease royalty
clause. Under that interpretation, both the division orders and the
lease in Heritage Resources permitted the lessee to deduct postproduction transportation costs. Because the division order did
not change the lease royalty clause, the court did not need to consider whether the royalty owners could benefit from Gavenda's exception to the binding-until-revoked rule. Nevertheless, the
Heritage Resources court felt compelled to espouse dicta regarding
the court of appeals' application of the Gavenda exception.
In Heritage Resources, the supreme court noted that, under the
court of appeals' interpretation of the lease royalty clause, Middleton and Gavenda would apply.2 30 The supreme court concluded,
however, that "[u]nder Gavenda, Heritage would be liable, if at all,
228. It is the intention expressed in the language of the instrument that governs, and
not the meaning that the parties actually may have intended but failed to express. Canter
v. Lindsey, 575 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Davis v.
Andrews, 361 S.W.2d 419, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Judices
tried to amend the third division order to reflect their intent by deleting the phrase permitting the deductions. Judice, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 535. In hindsight, the royalty owners
should have replaced the word "net" with "gross" and should have deleted the phrase "at
the well" in addition to deleting the deductions phrase.
229. Judice, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 534.
230. Heritage, 39 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 540.
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only for the amount of the unpaid royalty it retained."' 231 Since
there were other working interest owners who would have benefited from the cost deductions, the court stressed that the court of
appeals erred in holding Heritage liable for the total amount of
deductions.2 3 2 That conclusion comports with the criticisms of the
court of appeals' application of Gavenda which are outlined above
in Part II. Apparently content to correct only this mistaken view of
Gavenda, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in Heritage
Resources did not address the other weaknesses in the appellate
court's analysis. In particular, the supreme court failed to address
the appellate court's view of the corporate relationship between
Heritage and Urantia in finding unjust enrichment, and its improper application of the "no amendments" and "no liability"
clauses.
6.

The Implications of Heritage Resources and Judice for
Division-Order Jurisprudence
The supreme court and court of appeals decisions in Heritage
Resources and Judice ultimately add little to division-order case law
in Texas. In all likelihood, their most significant contributions will
prove to be the definitions they assign to phrases commonly encountered in lease royalty clauses and division orders, particularly
"market value at the well" and "net proceeds." While the definitions assigned to those phrases might frustrate the intent of the
parties in particular cases, they do, at least, provide guidance in the
drafting of future leases and division orders.
Aside from providing drafting guidance, however, the Heritage
Resources and Judice opinions merely affirm that Texas divisionorder jurisprudence is sui generis. Both decisions show that, rather
than being grounded in a particular theory, such as contract or estoppel, Texas division-order case law revolves around the bindinguntil-revoked rule. Unfortunately, neither opinion in Heritage Resources provides sufficient guidance about the effect which other
clauses in the division order might have on that rule, including the
effect of the "no amendments" clause and the "no liability" clause.
Moreover, although both opinions perfunctorily proceed through
the correct framework for resolving division-order disputes, they
231. Id.
232. Id.
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illustrate that the malleable rules of interpretation render it impossible to confidently predict the results. Finally, in the continual
battle between the competing policies of royalty owners and producers, the Texas high court's Heritage Resources opinion represents a victory for producers by allowing them to avoid lease
language designed to ensure that they bear the burden of post-production costs.
III.

STATUTORY DIVISION-ORDER LAW

The foregoing discussion of division-order case law reveals that
many Texas courts overtly acknowledged the competing policies of
producers and royalty owners regarding the effect of division orders on the royalty obligation. Similarly, in over a quarter of the
states,233 legislatures have recognized the need to balance these
competing policies. For example, a division-order statute in North
Dakota had been enacted expressly "as a means of increasing the
bargaining power of landowners in their dealings with major oil
2' 34
companies concerning rights under oil and gas leases.
In 1991, largely in response to the calls of royalty owners, Texas
also adopted statutory provisions governing the use of division orders. 235 Those provisions augment the pre-existing 1983 statute
233. See Matrix of Division Order Statutes by State, 21 NADOA NEWSLETrER (Nat'l

Ass'n of Division Order Analysts, Dallas, Tex.), July 1995, at 14-18 (on file with the St.
Mary's Law Journal);see also Ernest E. Smith, The New Division Order: Legal and Practical Aspects (attaching matrix of division order statutes to his article), in 42 ROCKY MmN.

MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997).
234. Imperial Oil of North Dakota v. Consolidated Crude Oil Co., 851 F.2d 206, 210
(8th Cir. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-39.3 (Michie 1995).

235. Act of June 16, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 650, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2392; see John
R. Tilly, Stirring the Muddy Waters: Statutory Impact on Division Orders in Texas and
Elsewhere, STATE BAR OIL, GAS & MIN. L. SECTION NEWSLETrER 1 (June 1992) (examining confusion created by division order statute). In his article, Tilly describes the setting
that prompted the birth of the division order provisions:

Prior to the opening of the 72nd Texas legislative session in 1991, Brad Shields, a
lobbyist for The National Association of Royalty Owners, Inc. (NARO), approached
Rep. Tom Craddick (R. Midland), a member of the House Committee on Energy, and

suggested the need for legislation to protect royalty owners from onerous and unfair
division orders. Aware of NARO's efforts, a lobbyist for Scurlock Permian Corp. also

sought out Rep. Craddick with its own form of a bill (which the Texas Mid-Continent
Oil and Gas Association and its members soon embraced) that was intended to bring
some uniformity to the use of division order in Texas.
Himself a royalty and working interest owner who thought the issue needed attention, Rep. Craddick agreed to sponsor such a bill. Thus began an active, sometimes
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that governed the obligations of "payors," who could be either pur-

chasers or producers,
in making payments to royalty owners, or
236
"payees," in Texas.

The legislative history of these 1991 amend-

ments reveals two primary purposes for the additions: (1) merely
to "enact" existing case law regarding division orders, and (2) to

protect the lessor's rights in an oil and gas lease.237

The following sections analyze the extent to which the amended
statute actually fulfills these two goals. Unfortunately, that analysis involves navigating a convoluted course of vague provisions and
contradictory terms. Interpreting these terms and provisions re-

quires applying general rules of statutory construction in addition
acrimonious and tense debate, inside and outside committee hearing rooms, between
those who sell and those who buy petroleum products pursuant to the terms of a
division order.
Id.; see also HousE COMM. ON ENERGY, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1605, 72d Leg., R.S.
(noting that "[clomplaints from royalty owners emerge when the Division Orders alter the
terms of the previously negotiated oil or gas lease, which is the basic legal instrument
granting the rights to a lessee or operator to drill and develop a property for production.").
236. The royalty payment statute was originally passed in 1983. Act of May 24, 1983,
68th Leg., R.S., ch. 228, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 966 (codified as amended at TEX. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. §§ 91.401-91.406 (Vernon 1993 & Supp. 1997)). The statute was passed "to
compel timely payment of proceeds to royalty interest owners by those persons or entities
occupying the status of a 'payor."' Koch Oil Co. v. Wilber, 895 S.W.2d 854, 868 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1995, writ denied) (Walker, C.J., dissenting). The payor liability statute
sets out time periods for royalty payments, permits withholding payments without interest
for title problems, and allows for interest in certain other cases. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. §§ 91.402(a), 91.402(b)(1), 91.403 (Vernon 1993). The statute defines a payor as "the
party who undertakes to distribute oil and gas proceeds to the payee [royalty owner]"
whether as a lessee or first purchaser. Id. § 91.401(2). The statute originally designated the
first purchaser as the payor unless the owner of the right to produce and the first purchaser
agreed that the owner of the right to produce had the responsibility of paying royalties.

See TEX.

NAT. RES. CODE ANN.

§ 91.401 historical note (Vernon 1993) [Act of May 24,

1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 228, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 966, 966] (providing original statutory
definition of "payor"). That definition was amended in 1991 to clarify that it is sufficient
for the first purchaser and producer to agree to place the responsibility on the producer.
Id.
The original definition of "payor" was misconstrued by courts. Courts interpreted the
definition as requiring, in addition to the agreement, the actual payment of the proceeds to
the producer before the first purchaser could avoid payor liability. See Northern Natural
Gas Co. v. Vandenburg, 785 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ) (adopting position that division order statute requires purchaser to actually pay out proceeds to
producer before being relieved of liability); see also Ernest E. Smith, The New Division
Order: Legal and PracticalAspects, 42 RocKY MT. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997)
(manuscript at 21-23, on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal) (evaluating courts' interpretation of original payor definition as imposing third requirement of actual payment).
237. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1605, 72d Leg., R.S.
(1991).
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to following the guidance provided by the statute's legislative history. Although commentators who undertake this interpretive process could reach different conclusions on specific issues, all would

likely agree that the statute could have been more clearly
written.238
A.

A Preliminary Issue: Whether Royalty Owners Must Sign a
Division Order

In the 1991 amendments, the Texas legislature addressed several
questions regarding the effect of division orders on the obligation
to pay royalties. The question initially addressed is whether payors
can require royalty owners to sign a division order before royalty
owners become entitled to receive their payments.239 As a matter
of industry custom, many lessees and purchasers impose such a requirement on royalty owners. 240 For example, in the Oklahoma
case of Hull v. Sun Refining & Marketing Co.,241 the purchaser,
who had refused to make royalty payments until execution of division orders, 24 2 relied upon that custom when royalty owners
brought suit to compel payment of royalties.243 The Oklahoma
238. See Ernest E. Smith, The New Division Order: Legal and PracticalAspects, 42
L. INST. (forthcoming 1997) (noting that Texas Division Order Statute is
"an unfortunate example" of statute that, although seeming clear at first glance, is "fraught
with ambiguity when closely examined"); Martin R. Bennett, Comment, Division Orders:
Impact of the Payment for Proceeds of Sale Statute, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 513, 514 (1995)
(recognizing that, though purpose of division order statute may be to clarify position of
purchasers and royalty owners, its poor drafting leaves many issues unresolved); Richard
F. Brown, Texas Division Orders and the Texas Division Order Statute, THE LANDMAN,
Mar./Apr. 1993, at 34-37 (outlining controversies arising out of division orders and noting
how they are exacerbated by ambiguities of division order statute).
239. TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 91.402(c)-(d) (Vernon 1993).
240. See Hull v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Co., 789 P.2d 1272, 1278 (Okla. 1989) (stating that
"a recognized custom and usage of the oil and gas industry included the requirement that
royalty holders execute division orders before receiving royalty payments"); 4 HOWARD R.
WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 701, at 573-74 (1995) (recognizing
that payors customarily ask payees to sign division orders before paying); see also Donald
J. Brannan, Division Orders, 8 E. MIN. L. FOUND. § 12.07, at 12-12 (1987) (emphasizing
practical considerations that historically have mandated that royalty owners sign division
orders).
241. 789 P.2d 1272 (Okla. 1989).
242. Hull, 789 P.2d at 1276.
243. Id. The purchaser, Sun, raised the lessors' failure to sign a standard division order as an affirmative defense, alleging that execution of the order was a condition precedent to the receipt of royalty payments under its (Sun's) oil purchase contract with the
lessee. Id.
ROCKY MT. MIN.
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Supreme Court held that the applicable payment statute did not
require execution of a division order before recovery of royalties as
long as there was a showing of marketable title. 2 "
While the Hull case provided an answer to this question in
Oklahoma, no Texas court had pointedly addressed whether a les-

sor was required to sign a division order as a condition of payment.245 The Texas division-order legislation, though, establishes

that signing a division order can be made a condition for payment,
but only in limited circumstances: (1) when a payee refuses to sign
a "form" oil division order, the form of which is set forth in the

statute;2 46 or (2) when a payee refuses to sign a division order con244. Id. at 1277; see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Page Farms, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 791,792-93
(Ark. 1985) (refusing to require lessor to sign division orders before receiving royalty payment). But see Blausey v. Stein, 400 N.E.2d 408, 410-11 (Ohio 1980) (requiring lessor to
sign division order before receiving royalty payment).
In Hull, the court was not swayed by evidence that industry custom required royalty
owners to sign division orders before payment. See Hull, 789 P.2d at 1278-79 (finding that
Oklahoma payment statute prevailed over custom and usage). That custom originated
with third-party oil purchasers, who had no other contractual agreements with the lessor.
See Marvin G. Twenhafel, Oil-Gas Division Orders: Their Origin, Varieties, and Usage,
27B ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1479, 1485 (1982) (stressing that division orders developed
in context of third party oil purchasers). Because the oil royalty clause in the lease generally permitted the lessor to take her oil royalty in kind, the division order with the purchaser was viewed as a contract for sale. Id. However, as described herein, neither case
law nor the division-order statute view the division order as a contract for the sale of
goods. See discussion infra Part IV.A. Moreover, the view that the in-kind royalty provision leaves title to the oil in the lessee is questionable.
245. Although Texas courts had not addressed a case with facts identical to those in
Hull, several cases had recognized the right of the royalty owner to receive interest on
payments that had been withheld by a payor. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. 1978) (refusing to insist on strict statutory compliance
in allowance of interest when necessary to permit compensation for detention of one's
money); see also Si M. Bondurant, Royalty Owner Rights Under Division Orders,25 TULSA
L.J. 571, 595-96 (1990) (stating, "[tjhe Texas cases and those of other common law jurisdictions overwhelmingly support the right of the royalty owner to be paid interest on suspended funds."). In one recent case a Texas court stated, in dicta, that payors could
require division orders as a condition of payment. See Koch Oil Co. v. Wilber, 895 S.W.2d
854, 865 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1995, writ denied) (finding that "Tesoro [purchaser] was
entitled to receive a signed division order from the payee as a condition for the payment of
proceeds from the sale of oil"). However, the court in Wilber cited no authority for this
proposition. Id. Texas courts have recognized the payor's right to suspend payments with
interest when the division order so provides. Gulf Pipeline Co. v. Nearen, 135 Tex. 50, 138
S.W.2d 1065, 1068 (1940); Lasater v. Convest Energy Corp., 615 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
246. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402(d) (Vernon Supp. 1997). The original 1991
version of this statutory form subsequently was amended in 1995. See id. historical and
statutory notes (outlining 1995 amendments to division order form). The 1995 legislation
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taining only the seven provisions listed in the statute.247 Most of
enacted the following changes and additions to the "PAYMENT" provision of section
91.402(d)'s division order form: (1) the minimum amount for disbursements increased
from $25 to $100; (2) the final date for disbursement payments shifted, subject to the following proviso, from December 31 of each year to a revolving payment date of twelve
months of accumulated proceeds; and (3) a sentence was added, creating the proviso that
"payors may hold accumulated proceeds of less than $10 until production ceases or the
payor's responsibility for making payment for production ceases, which ever occurs first."
Id Additionally, the legislature deleted the "20 percent" limit that had preceded "withholding tax" in the form's final sentence. Id.
The statutory form for oil payments allegedly fulfills the statute's criteria. Yet, the form
includes terms that differ from those set forth in the statute. The form includes differing
provisions regarding termination, terms of sale, and indemnity. Compare TEX. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. §§ 91.402(c)(1)(A)-(G) (Vernon 1993) (listing provisions that payor is entitled
to include in division order that serves "[a]s a condition for the payment of proceeds from
the sale of oil and gas production to payee"), with TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402(d)
(Vernon Supp. 1997) (providing division order form that that may be used "[i]n the alternative" to satisfy the provisions of section 91.402(c)); see also Martin R. Bennett, Comment, Division Orders: Impact of the Payment for Proceeds of Sale Statute, 47 BAYLOR L.
REV. 513, 519 (1995) (noting differences between form provisions and enumerated provisions necessary for conditional payment). These differences could lead royalty owners to
question whether they could be required to sign this form as a condition of payment.
Under rules of statutory interpretation, the answer would likely be "yes." The Texas Government Code asserts that in enacting a statute it is presumed that all language included is
intended to be effective. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.021(2) (Vernon 1988). Similarly,
case law recognizes that every word or phrase used in a statute "is presumed to have been
used intentionally, with a meaning and a purpose." Valley Int'l Properties v. Los Campeones, Inc., 568 S.W.2d 680, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref d n.r.e), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 902 (1978). In light of these statutory construction rules, the oil division
order form should be given effect, thus requiring a payee to sign the order, when requested, before receiving royalty payments.
The National Association of Division Order Analysts has promulgated a form to be used
for oil and gas. NADOA Model Form Division Order, 21 NADOA NEWSLETTER (Nat'l
Ass'n of Division Order Analysts, Dallas, Tex.), July 1995, at 3 (on file with the St. Mary's
Law Journal). For a discussion of the NADOA form, see Ernest E. Smith, The New Division Order: Legal and PracticalAspects, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming
1997).
247. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 91.402(c)(1)(A)-(G) (Vernon 1993). Specifically,
section 91.402(c)(1) sets forth the seven permissible provisions as follows:
(c)(1) As a condition for the payment of proceeds from the sale of oil and gas production to payee, a payor shall be entitled to receive a signed division order from payee
containing only the following provisions:
(A) the effective date of the division order, transfer order, or other instrument;
(B) a description of the property from which the oil or gas is being produced
and the type of production;
(C) the fractional and/or decimal interest in production claimed by payee, the
type of interest, the certification of title to the share of production claimed,
and, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, an agreement to notify payor at
least one month in advance of the effective date of any change in the interest in
production owned by payee and an agreement to indemnify the payor and re-

408 "
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the seven listed provisions concern specific terms that serve the division order's basic purposes of affirming the size of the payee's
interest and protecting the payor in the event of overpayments. Indeed, the statute explicitly provides that none of the provisions
"amends" the lease.248

Despite the declaration that none of the seven enumerations
amends the provisions, one provision arguably does permit an
amendment. That provision allows inclusion of terms in division
orders regarding "the valuation and timing of settlements of oil
and gas production to the payee. '249 This "valuation" provision is
sufficiently broad to encompass clauses such as those inserted in
the Middleton and Heritage Resources division orders. The inser-

tion of these clauses could amend the basis for calculating royalty
as set forth in the lease royalty clause. As in Middleton, if the lease

calls for valuation on a "market value royalty" basis, then a "proceeds" or "amount realized" valuation provision in the division order obviously would amend the lease royalty clause. Similarly, the
language concerning deductions in the Heritage Resources division
order also would qualify under the statute as a permissible "valua-

tion" provision. This conclusion would follow under either the
supreme court's interpretation that the lease permitted deductions,
imburse the payor for payments made if the payee does not have merchantable
title to the production sold;
(D) the authorization to suspend payment to payee for production until the
resolution of any title dispute or adverse claim asserted regarding the interest
in production claimed by payee;
(E) the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of payee;
(F) provisions for the valuation and timing of settlements of oil and gas production to the payee; and
(G) a notification to the payee that other statutory rights may be available to a
payee with regard to payments.
Id.

248. See TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402(c)(2) (Vernon 1993) (providing that
division order containing seven provisions listed in TEx. NAT. RES. CODE. ANN.
§ 91.402(c)(1) "does not amend any lease or operating agreement between the interest
owner and the lessee or operator or any other contracts for the purchase of oil or gas").
249. Id. § 91.402(c)(1)(F). Under this "valuation" provision, if the lease royalty clause
required royalty to be calculated on a "proceeds" or "amount realized" basis, then the
lessee or purchaser could insert language in the division order as needed to clarify the
exact terms of the underlying contract from which the "proceeds" would be "realized."
The insertion of such language in a division order would not amend the lease royalty
clause, and, consequently, the statute would require the lessor to sign the division order as
a condition for receiving payment.
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or the court of appeals' interpretation that the lease did not permit
deductions. In the latter instances, however, the division order
"valuation" terms permitting deductions would amend the lease
royalty clause.
The initial question for many royalty owners in these Middleton
and Heritage Resources situations is whether the statute requires
them to sign division orders even though they amend the lease royalty clause. The answer appears to be "yes," because, as described
above, these "amending" insertions are proper "valuation" provisions. Unfortunately, at least from the payees' perspective, the
statute has no express language stating that a payee may refuse to
sign a division order if any of the seven enumerated provisions in
fact "amends" the lease royalty clause.25°
Although payees may have to sign a division order containing
terms that amend the lease, other provisions of the statute may
protect their rights as created in oil and gas leases, even while that
division order is in effect. For example, section 91.402(h) of the
Texas Natural Resources Code states that a division order shall not
change express lease obligations and establishes that "[a]ny provision of a division order between payee and its lessee which is in
contradictionwith any provision of an oil and gas lease is invalid to
the extent of the contradiction." '25 1 In other words, this "no contradictions" provision negates any conflicting division-order provisions and establishes that the lease royalty clause determines the
lessee's royalty obligation. By reinstating lease terms regardless of
contradictory division-order terms, this provision renders Middleton's binding-until-revoked rule useless for a lessee when its division order contradicts the lease royalty clause.
B.

The Role of the Middleton Rule

The accuracy of the above conclusion regarding the usefulness of
Middleton's binding-until-revoked rule under the statute becomes
250. The statute does contain a clause stating that division orders with those terms do
not "amend" the lease. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402(c)(2) (Vernon 1993). Yet,
that section does not seem to permit the lessor to avoid the condition of payment provi-

sions. This "no amendment" language arguably could mean that the division order does
not permanently amend the lease, but that the order is nevertheless binding until revoked

under section 91.402(g). Having signed the division order, the payee must rely on other
provisions to find protection for his or her lease rights.
251. TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 91.402(h) (Vernon 1993) (emphasis added).
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questionable in light of other provisions of the statutory scheme.
In particular, section 91.402(g) creates uncertainty about the role
of Middleton's binding-until-revoked rule. Section 91.402(g)
adopts, nearly verbatim, the language of Middleton and states,
"[d]ivision orders are binding for the time and to the extent that
they have been acted on and made the basis of settlements and
payments. ' 2 5 2 Based upon this language, lessees could argue that
the statute preserves the Middleton rule and universally prevents
suits for underpayment of royalties made while their division orders were in effect, regardless of whether the division order "contradicts" the lease royalty clause. For payors, such an
interpretation obviously would inject more certainty into the payment process, 253 but that interpretation also would render meaningless the "no contradictions" provisions of 91.402(h), which
negates division order terms that contradict the lease royalty
clause.
Because of yet another provision in the division-order statute,
however, the lessee's position in favor of the binding-until-revoked
rule still might prevail in the "market value royalty" situation. Section 91.402(i) provides that "a division order may be used to clarify
royalty settlement terms in the oil and gas lease. '254 That section
mandates that the term "market value," as used in a lease royalty
clause, "shall be defined as the amount realized at the mouth of the
well. ' 255 Read broadly, this language purports to replace "market
value royalty" standards in leases with "amount realized" standards. That switch would reverse the Vela rule, providing that

252. Id. § 91.402(g).
253. See John R. Tilly, Division Orders: Can't Live with 'Em, Can't Live Without 'Em,
43 ArN. INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N § 8.07[3][b], at 8-15 (1992) (explaining that
under rule that division orders cannot alter lease terms, payees logically will argue they are
not bound by pricing standards set out in division order if those terms contravene lease).
Tilly writes:
Such argument would, of course, expose payors to uncertain liabilities when, in good
faith, payors attempted to explain and calculate the proper payment method in the
division order. The better argument, it seems, is set forth in the court opinions that
bind both payor and payee to the terms of the division order until revoked by one of
them.
Id.

254.

TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN.

255. Id.

§ 91.402(i) (Vernon 1993) (emphasis added).
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"market value" is to be determined on the day of production rather
than according to the lessee's contract price.256
Although interpreting section 91.402(i) to change Texas law by
reversing the Vela rule would please producers, 57 that interpreta-

tion goes too far. According to the statute, section 91.402(i) applies to division orders, not leases, and, even then, only to division
orders executed after 1991. Therefore, the statute sanctions the
use of an "amount realized" standard only in a division order

signed after that date.258 Under section 91.402(i), then, an
"amount realized" division order would "clarify" rather than contradict a "market value" lease royalty clause. And under section
91.402(g), that "amount realized" standard would be binding until
revoked.
Obviously, the legislature would have created less confusion had
it omitted the "clarifying" provision and simply provided that an
"amount realized" standard in a division order shall not be considered a "contradiction" to the "market value" standard in a lease.
Omitting the "clarifying" provision would also avoid arguments
that this section permits the insertion of clauses, other than an

"amount realized" standard, to "clarify" royalty terms. Rules of
statutory interpretation, however, would require interpreting the
word "clarify" to permit only the insertion of terms specifically set
forth in the second sentence of section 91.402(i). 259

256. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. 1968); see discussion
supra Part II.A.1. and note 42.
257. Producers would welcome this interpretation under the marketing realities prevailing when Vela was decided. In today's gas market, however, "market value" prices
could be lower than contract prices. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
258. 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND
GAS § 6.5, at 297-0 (1996).
259. The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that "[w]here general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only
objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words." 2A
NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17, at 188 (5th ed.
1992); Hightower v. State Comm'r of Educ., 778 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989,
no writ). Along these same lines, "[w]here the opposite sequence is found, i.e., specific
words following general ones, the doctrine is equally applicable, and restricts application of
the general term to things that are similar to those enumerated." 2A NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 47.17, at 188 (5th ed. 1992); see Gulf Ins. Co. v.
James, 143 Tex. 424, 429-30, 185 S.W.2d 966, 969 (1945) (providing that "where words of
general import are followed immediately by words of restricted import, the general language will be limited by the more restricted language").
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In summary, under the Texas division-order statute, Middleton's
binding-until-revoked rule remains largely, but not totally, intact.
In situations mirroring the Middleton facts, which include a signed
division order supplanting the lease's "market value royalty" valuation clause with an "amount realized" standard, section 91.402(i)
considers that the division order properly "clarifies" the royalty
terms. The "amount realized" standard in such a case is not an
impermissible "contradiction" under section 91.402(h). Moreover,
under section 91.402(g) such a division order would be binding until revoked. Thus, with the Middleton facts, the binding-until-revoked rule is preserved.
Under the statute, however, the binding-until-revoked rule has
been rendered irrelevant for the deduction issue raised in the Heritage Resources opinions.26 ° In Heritage Resources, as described
previously, the supreme court found no conflict between the lease
royalty clause and division-order terms charging post-production
transportation costs against the lessors' royalty. Because revoking
the division order would not permit the lessors to avoid the burden
of these costs, Middleton's binding-until-revoked rule became irrelevant. However, under the court of appeals' holding that the division-order terms did conflict with the lease royalty clause, the
binding-until-revoked rule governed the lessors' claim for underpayments made while the division orders were in effect.
Applying the statute to the court of appeals' view of the Heritage
Resources case reveals that the binding-until-revoked rule would
again be irrelevant. Under the division-order statute, a division order between a lessor and lessee that charges post-production costs
to a royalty owner in contravention of the lease royalty clause
prohibiting these deductions would be subject to the "no contradictions" fiat of section 91.402(h). Since the "no deductions" language in the division order would be invalid, the division order
could not "bind" the royalty owner. Instead, the lease royalty
clause would control in spite of the contradictory terms of the division order.
The approach to the deduction issue described above comports
with the legislative intent behind the statute. The statute's legislative history recognizes royalty owners' concerns about division or-

260. TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 91.402(i) (Vernon 1993).
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ders requiring lessors to bear post-production costs when their
leases provide that they should not have to bear those costs. 26 1 In

addition, the statute's treatment of the Middleton rule furthers another purpose expressed in the legislative history of the bill-the
goal of merely "enacting" extant case law. But, the Gavenda decision created an unjust-enrichment exception to the binding-untilrevoked rule. Whether the statute also "enacts" that exception is
discussed below.
C.

The Fate of Gavenda

As explained earlier, a royalty owner would invoke the Gavenda
exception in response to the lessee's reliance on Middleton's binding-until-revoked rule. Therefore, to the extent that the statute
renders the Middleton rule useless for lessees, the Gavenda exception becomes irrelevant as well. And recall that the exception
never provided relief to royalty owners trying to recover for under
payments occurring while a division order with an "amount realized" term was in effect. But what is the fate of the exception
under the statute in cases with facts akin to those in Gavenda? In
other words, what role does the Gavenda exception play in cases in
which division orders misstate the size of the payee's interest as
created in a mineral or royalty deed?
The answer to the above questions exposes a possible fallacy in
the legislative claim that the division-order statute leaves existing
case law undisturbed.262 As applied to this Gavenda scenario, the
statute appears to reverse the Gavenda decision. That reversal
stems from omissions in the "no contradiction" provision of section
91.402(h), and from omissions in the "no amendments" provision
of section 91.402(c)(2). Whereas the "no amendments" and "no
contradictions" provisions of the statute protect lease royalty owners with language prohibiting amendments to "leases," they omit
261. See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1605, 72d Leg., R.S.
(1991) (noting that "[p]roblems arise when royalty owners are asked to bear part of the
production and/or transportation costs in the Division Order agreement and feel that their
portion of the proceeds from the sale of production should be free and clear of such costs,
as may be outlined in the lease agreement.").
262. See HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1605, 72d Leg., R.S.
(1991) (announcing that proposed division order bill "adds language that reflects existing
case law").
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language negating division-order terms that contradict a "deed. 2' 63
Under rules of statutory construction, this omission must be given
effect. 2 1 Therefore, whether deliberately or by accident, the division-order statute apparently overrules Gavenda.65
D.

The Fate of Cabot Corp. v. Brown

While an omission of language from section 91.402(h) has proba-

bly led to the reversal of Gavenda, express language in that section
seems to overrule another case, Cabot Corp. v. Brown. 66 Section

91.402(h) provides that division orders "shall not change or relieve
26 7
the lessee's ... implied obligations under an oil and gas lease.
That language contradicts Cabot, which extended Middleton's

binding-until-revoked rule in order to bar a royalty owner's claim
for breach of the implied covenant to market. Instead of adopting
the Cabot rule, this section appears to resurrect the holding of an
earlier case, Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyote. 6 8 Because this marketing covenant is implied in the lease as a
matter of fact,2 69 the statute's rejection of Cabot and resurrection
263. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 91.402(c)(2), (h) (Vernon 1993).
264. The canon of construction known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius provides
that when the "things to which [a statute] ... refers are designated, there is an inference
that all omissions should be understood as exclusions"). 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 47.23, at 216 (5th ed. 1992).

265. Ernest E. Smith, The New Division Order: Legal and PracticalAspects, 42
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 24, on file with the St.
Mary's Law Journal). Professor Smith concludes that "whether intentionally or not, the
division order statute may have overruled Gavenda v. Strata Energy." Id. But see Martin
R. Bennett, Comment, Division Orders: Impact of the Payment for Proceeds of Sale Statute, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 513, 521 (1995) (questioning whether division order statute alters
holding in Gavenda).
266. 754 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1987).

267. TEX.

NAT. RES. CODE ANN.

§ 91.402(h) (Vernon 1993).

268. 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979), writ rerd n.r.e. per curiam, 611
S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1981). In Pyote, the court enforced the implied covenant of marketing
against a lessee despite the terms of its division orders. Id. at 283-84; see also discussion
supra Part II.A.2.
269. See, e.g., Danciger Oil & Refin. Co. of Tex. v. Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 154 S.W.2d
632 (1941) (implying covenants as matter of fact so as to carry out parties' intentions);
Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Stuard, 7 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1928,
writ ref'd) (holding that implied obligation to properly develop premises "became a part of
the written contract"); Petroleum Producers Co. v. Steffens, 139 Tex. 257, 162 S.W.2d 698,
699 (1942) (finding that lease terms implied obligation on lessee "to drill offset wells and
development wells"); see also RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 8.1,
at 445-48 (3d ed. 1991) (examining nature of covenants implied in oil and gas lease).
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of Pyote comports with the goal, as expressed in the statute's legislative history, of preserving royalty owners' rights under their previously negotiated leases. 270 The rejection of Cabot, however,
contradicts the purpose of the statute as stated in the bill analysis,

which describes the statute as enacting existing law. 27 1 In the next
section, however, this Article determines that the Texas statute effectively has adopted, and clarified, existing case law regarding an-

other issue, the effect of a third-party purchaser's division order on
the lessee's royalty obligations.
E. The Statute's Treatment of Third-PartyPurchasers

In the preceding sections, the primary goal of this Article has
been to analyze the effect of division orders on the lessee's royalty

obligation, focusing on division orders sent by lessees to their lessors. Frequently, however, and particularly in the payment of oil
royalties, a division order is sent to the lessor by a third-party purchaser. 272 Because the lessee is not a party to this lessor/third-party
270. As described in the text, the statutory terms repeatedly enforce the supremacy of
the lease royalty clause, and overruling Cabot fits with this scheme.
271. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 1605, 72d Leg., R.S. 1991.
But see Martin R. Bennett, Comment, Division Orders: Impact of the Payment for Proceeds of Sale Statute, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 513 (1995) (noting statutory provisions that suggest Cabot has not been overruled); 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER,
TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 6.5, at 299 (1996) (noting lessees could argue that instead
of overruling Cabot, the Natural Resources Code has codified it, but recognizing that such
argument makes subsection (h) "superfluous" and is inconsistent with subsection (c)).
272. Stuart C. Holliman, A Basic Overview of Division Orders, in STATE BAR OF
TEX., PROF'L DEV. PROGRAM, OIL AND GAS LAW: FOR LEGAL ASSISTANTS AND ATTORNEYS C, C-4 to C-5 (1984). Mr. Holliman explains the different purposes the division

order serves for an oil purchaser:
Under the typical oil royalty clause of an oil, gas and mineral lease, the lessor or
royalty owner has the right to take its share of the oil production in kind, and thereby
retains title to the royalty oil until it is sold .... In contrast, the gas royalty clause in a
typical lease provides the royalty owner with a mere right to participate in the proceeds or value derived from the sale of the gas, thereby vesting title to 8/8ths of the gas
produced in the lessee at the mouth of the well .... The effect of these clauses upon
the title to those substances is reflected in the marketing approach to them. With
regard to oil, because each interest owner has the right to market its own share of the
production, the purchaser must secure the commitment of each interest owner to the
marketing terms it proposes in order to be assured that it will receive the entire supply
of crude oil involved. A purchaser of crude oil, accordingly, will usually prepare a
division order for execution by all interest owners under which it obtains a commitment from each of them to deliver their respective share of production.... [However,]
because title to all of the gas produced is vested in the lessee, the purchaser is required
to contract only with the lessee for the purchase of the gas production.
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division order, questions have arisen about the effect of such a division order on the lessee's royalty obligation.
In providing satisfactory answers to these questions, it is important to consider the contrasts between the lessor/lessee relationship
and the lessor/third-party purchaser relationship. Specifically, the
third-party purchaser, having no contract with the lessor, justifiably
relies solely on the division order in dispersing the proceeds for the
oil or gas. The lessee, on the other hand, by a previously negotiated lease agreement, is obligated to pay royalties to the lessor, an
obligation which the lessor does not want clandestinely diminished
in a division order.
The legislature, while adopting language that is difficult to decipher, evidently respected the contrasting positions of lessees and
third-party purchasers. The statute protects third-party purchasers,
through its version of the binding-until-revoked rule, for payments
made pursuant to an unrevoked lessor/third-party purchaser division order. In order to protect the lessor's rights in the lease, however, the statute limits the use of the binding-until-revoked rule in
the case of lessor/lessee division orders. To further that purpose,
the statute also specifically states that a lessor/third-party purchaser division order shall not detract from the lessee's lease royalty obligations. This section of this Article sifts through the
statutory provisions which establish these rules. Determining
whether these rules reflect extant case law, as proclaimed in the
legislative history, necessitates reviewing cases which have considered the effect of third-party purchaser division orders on the
lessee's royalty obligation.
1. Case Law
In Texas, two courts reached different results when faced with
determining the effect of a lessor/third-party purchaser division order on the lessee's royalty obligation. In a 1989 case, Williams v.
Baker Exploration Co.,273 lessors sued three groups-the original
lessees, the assignees of the lease, and the purchaser of the oil-for
conversion and non-payment of royalties. 274 After the lessors had
Id. (citations omitted). But see discussion infra Part IV.A. (questioning whether oil royalty
clause properly should be interpreted as reservation of title in lessor).
273. 767 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, writ denied).
274. Williams, 767 S.W.2d at 194.
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signed and returned the oil purchaser's division order, the purchaser stopped making the specified royalty payments.2 75 Relying
on that third-party division order, the lessees and assignees claimed
they had no liability to the lessors for the purchaser's failure to pay
the royalties.276 Disagreeing, the court of appeals held that
"[Cabot] and Middleton do not excuse the lessees from payment of
the lessors' royalty merely because there have been division orders
executed by7 the lessors in favor of a purchaser of the leasehold oil
27

and gas."
In a case with similar facts decided a few years before Williams,

however, another Texas appellate court reached a contrary result.
In Cook v. Tompkins,278 a lessor had brought suit against her lessee
and several other parties to recover unpaid oil royalties.279 As in
Williams, the lessor in Cook had executed division orders sent by
275. Id. at 195.
276. Id
277. Id. at 196. The court did suggest, however, that the third-party purchaser division
order could excuse the lessee from liability if the order contained a provision expressly
relieving the lessee of that liability. Id. However, that conclusion is incorrect under statutory provisions that were in effect when the Williams case was decided. Section 91.401 of
the Texas Natural Resources Code, the royalty payment liability statute, was enacted in
1983 to provide remedies for lessors and other payees who do not receive their royalty
payments. That section provides that a first purchaser is liable for failure to timely pay
royalty payments unless the first purchaser and the producer have agreed that the operator
[lessee] shall be responsible for making royalty payments. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ArN.
§ 91.401 (Vernon 1993). Under this language, the statute provides a basis for a lessor to
recover from the oil or gas purchaser, regardless of a division order. It also determines
liability among purchasers and operators. See Koch Oil Co. v. Wilbur, 895 S.W.2d 854, 864
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1995, writ denied) (applying section 91.401 and definition of payor
to determine liability of oil purchasers and operators). But the royalty payment liability
statute does not purport to relieve the lessee of its lease obligations. Although this statute
was enacted six years before the Williams case was decided, the court did not address it. In
1991, the statute was amended to add the division order provisions, discussed in Part III
herein, which clarified that division orders cannot amend or detract from the lessor's rights
in the oil and gas lease. In light of these statutory provisions, as they have existed since
1983, as well as in light of the amendments, it is doubtful that the Williams court was
correct in concluding that an express provision in the lessor/third-party purchaser division
order could have relieved the lessee from its lease liability. Instead, the lessee should have
argued that it satisfied those lease terms, particularly its implied covenant to market, in its
sale to the purchaser. Or, as the Williams court noted, the lessee could have relied on an
express lease clause that relieved the lessee of liability after assigning all or part of its
interest. See Williams v. Baker Exploration Co., 767 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989,
writ denied). Unfortunately, the lessee in Williams failed to properly plead and prove that
point.
278. 713 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).
279. Cook, 713 S.W.2d at 418.
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the oil purchaser. 280 That purchaser having subsequently become
bankrupt, the lessor had not been paid for her oil. 281 Although the
court ultimately held that the lessee was not liable, its rationale was
not that the lessor/third-party division order automatically absolved the lessee of liability. 282 Instead, the court reasoned that the
lessee had satisfied the lease obligations-particularly those obligations imposed under the implied covenant to market-through its
sale of the production to the oil purchaser at the current market
price. 283
The Cook opinion, although ultimately holding that the lessee
was not liable, can be reconciled with the Williams court's conclusion that the third-party purchaser division orders did not supplant
the royalty obligations established in the lease. The Cook court
focused on the covenant of marketing, which is implied in the oil
and gas lease, and held that the lessee had satisfied the obligations
imposed on it by the marketing covenant. By focusing on this obligation, which arose under the lease, the Cook court implicitly recognized, as did the Williams court, that the third-party division
orders had not replaced the lease terms. In light of this similar
focus on the lease, the different results in the Williams and Cook
opinions should be attributed to the Williams lessee's failure to argue that it had fulfilled its lease obligations, particularly its duties
under the implied covenant of marketing. 28
2. Statutory Provisions
Section 91.402(h) of the division order statute appears to adopt
the Williams/Cook view that third-party purchaser division orders
do not supplant the lease royalty clause. The first sentence of section 91.402(h) provides that "[t]he execution of a division order
between a royalty owner and lessee or between a royalty owner
280. Id. at 419.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 421.
283. Id. The Cook court relied on the early case Wolfe v. Texas Co. Id. at 421 n.7
(citing Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 553 (1936)). For a
discussion of Wolfe, see infra note 337.
284. While the Williams opinion includes no discussion of the implied covenant of
marketing, it does note that the lessees may have been able to avoid liability under the
lease by relying on a provision in the lease stating that an assignment would relieve the
lessee of liability. Williams, 767 S.W.2d at 196. However, the lessees failed to raise that

point in their pleadings. See supra note 277.
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and a party other than lessee shall not change or relieve the lessee's
specific, expressed or implied obligation under an oil and gas
lease. ' 28 5 Under this provision, a lessee remains liable under the
lease, even after the lessor has signed the lessee's or a third-party's
division order. In order to avoid liability, lessees must show that
they have fulfilled their express and implied lease obligations.286
Thus, with the first sentence in section 91.402(h), the statute fulfills its declared intent to protect the lessor's rights in the oil and

gas lease. The next sentence of that section furthers the same purpose by clarifying that lessor/lessee division orders, like lessor/
third-party purchaser division orders, cannot detract from the lessor's rights under the lease. Specifically, that next sentence states
that "[a]ny provision of a division order between payee and its
lessee which is in contradiction with any provision of an oil and gas
lease is invalid to the extent of the contradiction. 2 87 However, this

"no contradictions" provision omits the "party other than lessee"
phrase found in the prior sentence.

Although one might be tempted to ignore this omission as a
mere legislative oversight, established rules of statutory construction would require giving it effect in interpreting the entire provision. 88 Under those rules, the omission of a reference to third285. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402(h) (Vernon 1993) (emphasis added).
286. A lessee could be successful in that effort by establishing, as did the lessee in
Cook, that the sale of the oil or gas to a third-party purchaser fulfilled its implied covenant
to market. Cook, 713 S.W.2d at 421. Although a court nevertheless could consider that
the express obligation to pay royalties has not been satisfied, if the lessee enters into a
contract with a purchaser with terms that satisfy the criteria of the marketing covenant,
then the lessee should not be deemed a permanent guarantor of the purchaser's performance. In fact, section 91.401(2) provides that the first purchaser, rather than the lessee,
shall be liable for failure to make timely payments unless there is an agreement that the
producer or operator will make those payments. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.401(2)
(Vernon 1993). Although this statutory provision was enacted in 1983, neither the Williams nor the Cook decisions discussed its effect on the lessees' liability. See supra note 236
for a discussion of Vandenburg and its misreading of the elements needed to make an
operator liable under the royalty payment statute.
287. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402(h) (Vernon 1993).
288. The Texas Government Code recognizes that in enacting a statute it is presumed
that all language included is intended to be effective. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.021(2)
(Vernon 1988). On the other hand, the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio
alterius is applied to omissions. This canon prescribes that "where a form of conduct, the
manner of its performance and operation, and the person and things to which it refers are
designated, there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions."
2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23, at 216 (5th ed.

1992).
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party purchasers must be read as a deliberate exclusion of lessor/
third-party purchaser division orders from the dictates of the "no
contradictions" provision. Therefore, a purchaser's division order
that contradicts the lease royalty clause would be valid until revoked, as provided in section 91.402(g).2 89 In contrast, same or

similar terms in a lessor/lessee's division order would be negated
under the "no contradictions" proviso in the second sentence of
section 91.402(h), rendering it useless for a lessee to rely on the
binding-until-revoked rule. Instead, the lessee becomes liable for
breaching the lease royalty clause, even for payments made pursuant to its contradictory division orders.
By negating terms that contradict the lease only in the case of
lessor/lessee division orders, the statute promotes the legislative
goal of protecting the lessor's royalty rights as established in its
prior agreement with the lessee, the oil and gas lease. Ensuring
that the lessor's express lease royalty rights survive after the lessor
signs division orders, subsection (h) also expressly protects the lessor's implied rights. In doing so, it appears to resurrect the Pyote
position regarding the effect of a lessee's division order on the
lessee's implied lease obligations. Recall that the Pyote decision
had held that a division order did not bar the lessor from holding
its lessee liable for breach of the implied covenant to market, 290 but
that decision was later restricted by the supreme court in Cabot
Corp. v. Brown.291 With the statute's apparent revival of the Pyote
position, as well as its apparent approval of the Williams/Cook approach, the implied covenant to market will play a larger role in
future royalty payment suits involving both lessor/lessee and lessor/
third-party division orders.

289. Professors Smith and Weaver use the example of unauthorized pooling to illustrate the different effects of the two sentences in subsection (h) on lessees and third-party
purchasers. They conclude that extending protection to third-party purchasers, as described in the text, "is consistent with traditional rules of statutory interpretation and with
a statutory purpose of protecting royalty owners from covert lease changes accomplished
through division orders." 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACOUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW
oF OIL & GAS § 6.5, at 296 (1996).
290. Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyote, 579 S.W.2d 280, 288 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1979), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).
291. 754 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1987). See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
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IV.

DIVISION-ORDER DISPUTES IN THE COMING DECADES

Because the statute maintains the viability of implied covenant
complaints even after a lessor has executed division orders, courts
in future cases will be required to further clarify the contours of
those implied duties. Although an analysis of implied-covenant
obligations is beyond the scope of this Article, other division order
issues also are destined to confront Texas courts in the decades to
come. Many of these disputes will focus on deciphering the division-order statutory provisions discussed earlier in Part III. Because the statute applies only to division orders executed after
1991, previously decided cases will continue to be relevant in
resolving future disputes. Moreover, the principles articulated in
those cases will be tested as changing market conditions spawn new
controversies over the royalty obligation.
New controversies are already challenging Texas courts. One
such example is oil royalty litigation in which lessors dispute payments made according to "posted price" provisions in leases and
division orders. Another example is cases involving the Vela scenario in reverse. This section briefly addresses the implications of
these two types of disputes for Texas division-order jurisprudence.
A.

The "Posted Price" Litigation

Historically, lessors have not disputed royalty payments for oil as
frequently as they have contested royalty payments for gas. Until
recently, the markets for oil, unlike for gas, had not given lessors
reason to challenge their oil royalty payments.292 Many of those
payments were based on the "posted price" for oil,2 93 a familiar
standard set forth either in the oil royalty clause or in division or292. The oil markets, of course, have historically experienced extreme fluctuations.
However, those fluctuations did not cause lessors to challenge the bases used by their lessees in calculating royalty. For a general historical discussion of fluctuations in the oil

market, see DANIEL

YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER

passim (1991)
293. The following clause is an example of a posted price royalty provision:
paying the market price prevailing in the field where produced on the date same is run
or sold; or, if there is no posted price in the field, the posted average price in the field,
the posted price average price for Gulf Coast fields of Louisiana for oil of like grade
and gravity.
3 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS ON OIL AND GAS LAW § 642.2, at 502.3
(1995) (citing typical Louisiana lease form).
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ders. The term "posted price" developed in the early days of the
oil industry, when companies actually posted their prices on fence
posts in the oil fields. 294 For decades, royalty owners remained
content with royalty payments based on that well-established
standard.
Beginning in 1983, circumstances began to change when a commodities market for oil was established on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), and lessors began noticing that the
NYMEX price frequently exceeded posted prices.295 Lessors began to claim that their lessees were calculating royalties on the
"posted price" and then re-selling the oil through affiliates for the
higher NYMEX prices. In response, many lessors-including the
states of Texas, California, Alaska, New Mexico, and Colorado, as
well as private land owners-brought suit against the major oil
companies challenging their age-old29practice
of calculating royal6
ties on the basis of "posted prices.
294. Jim Henderson, Oil Bust, TEX. Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 28, 29.
295. Craig R. Carver, Natural Gas Price Indices: Do They Provide a Sound Basis for
Sales and Royalty Payments?, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997). One
author has described the market changes that led to the posted price litigation as follows:
Until the mid-1980s, crude was worth whatever the oil companies said it was worth.
The game changed when oil futures began trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange, where the market value was established in the trading pit and made public
immediately. It was then that posted prices diverged from market value.
Jim Henderson, Oil Bust, TEX. Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 28, 29-31. However, oil producers
continued to pay royalties on the lower posted price set by themselves rather than the
higher NYMEX price. Id. at 31; Josh Kurtz, Oil Roulette, SANTA FE REP., June 14-20,
1995, at 11, 11. In refuting the allegations that they have underpaid royalties, the oil company defendants have argued, among other points, that the NYMEX price does not represent the value they have agreed to base royalties upon in their leases. "In other words, the
[NYMEX] price is not a price for oil which is produced at a well, but is a commodity
trading price affected by different factors than individual wellhead sales." Robert H.
Thomas, Issues in Oil Royalty Litigation, in STATE BAR OF TEX., PROF'L DEV. PROGRAM,
ADVANCED OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL LAW COURSE R, R-11 (1996).
296. Craig R. Carver, NaturalGas Price Indices: Do They Provide a Sound Basis for
Sales and Royalty Payments?, 42 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997). In California, officials for the state and the city of Long Beach accused seven of the state's largest
oil companies of undervaluing oil produced from federal lands for the past 32 years. Josh
Kurtz, Oil Roulette, SANTA FE REP., June 14-20, 1995, at 11, 11. The parties settled out of
court in 1993 for $345 million. Study Renews Royalty Issue on California Crude, OIL &
GAS J., May 27, 1996, at 26. The oil companies still failed to admit any wrongdoing. Matthews L. Wald, Did Oil Firms Shortchange US.?, ORANGE COUNTY (CAL.) REG., Mar. 31,
1996, at A3. The settlement prompted the United States Department of Interior to form
an interagency team in 1994 to investigate underpayment of royalties on federal land.
Study Renews Royalty Issue on CaliforniaCrude, OIL & GAS J., May 27, 1996, at 26. Cali-
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1. The "Retained Ownership" View of the Oil Royalty
Clause and Its Effect on Division-Order Analysis
The current "posted price" litigation raises myriad issues, procedural and substantive.297 For example, courts will be asked to defornia assisted the agency in its study by obtaining company documents sealed after the
settlement. Id. The interagency study suggests that major oil companies in California "received premiums above posted prices, but used posted prices as a benchmark for paying
royalties during the period 1978 to 1993." Nancy Moore, Spot Pricesfor Oil Royalties
Suggested, PLATT's OILGRAM NEWS, Dec. 18, 1995, at *2-3, available in 1995 WL 14219602.
It is estimated that as many as "10 oil companies may have underpaid royalties on federal
oil produced in California by as much as $856 million during the past 20 years." Study
Renews Royalty Issue on California Crude, OIL & GAS J., May 27, 1996, at 26. In late
August, the U.S. Minerals Management Service initiated a nationwide audit to investigate
potential underpayments of royalties for crude oil. See U.S. and CanadianIndustry News:
U.S. MMS Hunts Down Royalty Underpayments, ENERGY ALERT, Aug. 26, 1996, at *1,
availablein 1996 WL 8298373 (noting MMS's intention "to clamp down on producers who
paid royalties based on posted prices for their crude while selling it at a premium to posted
prices").
Alaska has taken in $3.7 billion in back taxes and royalties from three oil companies
since 1978. Josh Kurtz, Oil Roulette, SANTA FE REP., June 14-20, 1995, at 11, 11. In Texas,
the Texas General Land office is suing ten of the nation's largest oil producers for underpayment of royalties. See Texas Gen. Land Office v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 95-08680
(345th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Nov. 22, 1995). In another suit, "[a] Texas resident
and an Oklahoma foundation ... filed a class action against 26 major oil companies and
marketers alleging a conspiracy to fix prices." Hillary Durgin, Suit Accuses 26 Oil Firms of
Price Fixing, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 12, 1996, at *1, available in 1996 WL 5592342. This
second suit "seeks to represent any royalty owner who received payment for oil from anywhere in the continental United States, except for Alaska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
West Virginia and the Wilmington Field at Long Beach, California." Id.
According to a recent study commissioned by the Land Offices of Texas, New Mexico,
and Colorado, oil companies have been underpaying royalty owners by 3% to 6%. Jim
Henderson, Oil Bust, TEX. Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 28, 28. This 1994 study, conducted by
the Dallas-based Summit Resource Management, Inc., concluded that the posted price "is
arbitrary and only loosely related to the actual market value of oil." Id. at 29. The Summit
Report explains that "[tihe posted price usually has absolutely no bearing on the actual
value of the crude oil and is used only for accounting purposes and to reduce royalty and
tax payments." SUMMIT RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, INC., CRUDE OIL ROYALTY PAYMENT ANALYSIS: REPORT TO THE STATE LANDS OFFICES OF COLORADO, NEW MEXICO,
AND TEXAS (Feb. 21, 1995).

297. The substantive issues asserted in the suit filed in Texas by the General Land
Office include whether the defendants violated: (1) their express obligations assumed
under leases and division orders; (2) their implied duty to market with due diligence and
obtain the best price reasonably possible; (3) their statutory duties as lessees under sections
52.131, 32.155 and 34.057 of the Texas Natural Resources Code and sections 66.74 and
109.75 of the Texas Education Code; (4) their duty as merchants under the UCC to act
reasonably and in good faith and fair dealings; and (5) their duty to properly account and
pay production taxes on royalties. Plaintiffs' First Amended Original Petition at 8-10,
Texas Gen. Land Office v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 95-08630 (345th Dist. Ct., Travis County,
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cide whether the implied covenant of marketing applies to the
companies' actions, and if it does, to decide whether the companies' pricing and marketing practices have violated that covenant.2 98 In answering those and other questions, the courts first
Tex., Nov. 22, 1995). The procedural questions raised by the petition include whether the
controversy can be appropriately certified as a class action and the effect of the statute
limitations on the plaintiffs' claims. It is important to note that in deciding these issues, the
courts should consider the extensive statutory schemes in place regarding leases on state
lands and the calculation and payment of royalties to the state. There are many different
types of state lands: public school lands, relinquishment act lands, free royalty lands, University of Texas system lands, state park lands, eleemosynary and state memorial park
lands, and lands owned by departments, boards or agencies of the State of Texas. See H.
Philip Whitworth, Leasing and Operating State-Owned Lands for Oil and Gas Development, 16 TEX. TECH L. REV. 673, 675-86 (1985) (distinguishing various state lands which
may be leased and developed for oil and gas). The authority to regulate operations on
state lands has been conferred by statute to the General Land Office, the School Land
Board, and various boards for lease. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 31, 32, and 34
(Vernon 1993 & Supp. 1997) (establishing various administrative authorities to regulate
operations on state lands). These authorities have individual statutory schemes that address both the leasing and the calculation and payment of royalties to the state. See generally 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 9.5 (West 1996) (listing procedures in which state properties
are leased for exploration and development of oil and gas and applicable regulatory
scheme). For example, the General Land Office relies on market value for computing and
paying royalties to the state. Id. § 9.7(b)(1)(E)(i). Furthermore, because the Division Order statute expressly does not apply to a majority of state owned lands, these statutory
schemes assist in determining the role and function of division orders on royalty payments
owed to the state. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.405 (Vernon 1993) (exempting
lands controlled by board of regents of The University of Texas System and by General
Land Office from provisions of division order statute).
298. The primary contention regarding the scope of the implied covenant of marketing is whether or not the lessee has a duty to place the lessor's interests above its own in
marketing the oil or gas. For example, in Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist Church of
Pyote, 579 S.W.2d 280, 288 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 611
S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980), the court concluded the lessee had breached the covenant because
the marketing arrangement, which was advantageous to Amoco and some of its lessors, did
not satisfy the standard as applied to the plaintiff lessor.
The recent posted price litigation raises issues frequently raised in suits alleging breach
of the implied covenant to market. Courts have questioned marketing practices that appear to benefit only the lessee, and not the lessor, in making sales to affiliates. For example, in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, the court imposed a strict burden when the lessee
sold gas to an affiliate. 683 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 140 (Dec. 16, 1987), withdrawn, set aside, dism'd as moot, 760
S.W.2d 960 (1988). But courts have noted that sales to affiliates do not constitute an automatic violation of the marketing covenant. See, e.g., Shelton v. Exxon Corp., 719 F. Supp.
537, affd in part, rev'd in part,921 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1991); Parker v. TXO Prod. Corp., 716
S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ). See Jacqueline Lang Weaver,
Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law Under Federal Energy Price Regulation, 34 VAND.
L. REv. 1473, 1510 (1981) (discussing implied covenant to market); Roger D. Williams,
Lessee Dutiesand Lessor Rights in Gas Contracting Under the Implied Marketing Covenant
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must address a concept that has been at the periphery of divisionorder jurisprudence, a concept this Article refers to as the "retained ownership" view of the oil royalty clause. This "retained
ownership" view of the oil royalty clause could justify a conceptual
approach to oil division orders different from the approach developed in the courts for gas division orders.

The basis for the "retained ownership" theory for oil begins with
the language of the oil royalty clause itself. In addition to permit-

ting lessees to pay oil royalties on the basis of posted prices, the
typical clause provides the lessee with another option, the right to

pay the royalty "in kind" by delivering a fractional share of the
produced oil to the lessor. 299 Such an in-kind provision is common

in the oil royalty clause because oil, unlike gas, can be easily and
economically stored and transported.

°°

Because of the in-kind oil royalty provision, many commentators
and courts have advanced the theory that, after executing the lease,
the lessor retains title to the fractional share of the oil as stated in
the lease, which historically has been 1/8th. 30 1 Having retained title
to that oil, this theory proceeds, the lessor uses the division order
as a contract to sell the lessor's oil to the purchaser. 30 2 Based upon
of Oil, Gas, and Mineral Leases, 26 TULSA L.J. 547 passim (1991) (examining lessee duties
and lessor rights under implied marketing covenants of oil and gas leases).
299. A typical clause providing the right to pay oil royalty in-kind reads:
The royalties to be paid by Lessee are as follows: On oil, one-eighth of that produced
and saved from said land, the same to be delivered at the wells or to the credit of
Lessor into the pipe line to which the wells may be connected. Lessee shall have the
option to purchase any royalty oil in its possession, paying the market price therefor
prevailing for the field where produced on the date of purchase.
AAPL Form 675 Oil and Gas Lease, in EUGENE 0. KUNTZ ET AL., FORMS MANUAL TO
ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 12 (2d ed. 1993).
300. See supra note 7.
301. See, e.g., Stuart C. Holliman, A Basic Overview of Division Orders,in STATE BAR
OF TEX., PROF'L DEV. PROGRAM, OIL AND GAS LAW: FOR LEGAL ASSISTANTS C, C-25

(1984); David E. Pierce, Resolving Division Order Disputes. A Conceptual Approach, 35
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 16.02[1], at 16-5 to 16-6 (1989); Susan McCready Edwards,
Comment, A Suggested Analysis for Gas Division Orders, 17 TULSA L.J. 534, 535 (1982);
Richard F. Brown, Texas Division Orders and the Texas Division Order Statute, THE
LANDMAN, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 25. Early Supreme Court of Texas cases that decided
whether royalties should be treated as realty or personalty for tax purposes perpetuated
this view. See Hager v. Stakes, 116 Tex. 453, 294 S.W. 835, 840 (1927).
302. For example, Williams and Meyers define a division order as "[a] contract of sale
to the purchaser of oil or gas. The order directs the purchaser to make payment for the
value of the products taken in proportions set out in the division order." HOWARD R.
WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS

299 (9th ed. 1994).
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this reasoning, lessees could argue that the division order "contract," rather than the oil and gas lease, creates the payment obligation for the retained oil.
This "retained ownership" view of the oil royalty clause could
affect the posted price litigation in several respects. For example, if
the lessor/lessee oil division order is classified as a contractual sale
of goods, then the Uniform Commercial Code's covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, rather than the lease's implied covenant of
marketing, would apply. 3 Similarly, if the lessors have "sold"
their oil pursuant to third-party purchaser division orders, then the
defendant lessees could argue that they have no contractual liability to the lessors. Moreover, because the "retained ownership"
theory requires a different conceptual framework for oil, both parties could argue that case law developed from gas division order
cases is inapposite for oil division orders. Under that argument,
courts would be faced with the task of creating a separate set of
rules regarding oil division orders and the effect of oil division orders on the lessee's royalty obligation.
In deciding whether to view the oil division order differently
from the gas division order, courts should scrutinize the cases primarily responsible for perpetuating the "retained ownership" theory. These cases were decided in the 1920s and 1930s, an era of oil
and gas jurisprudence marked by doctrinal confusion,3 °4 when the
303. U.C.C. § 2-107(1); see David E. Pierce, Resolving Division Order Disputes: A
Conceptual Approach, 35 RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 16.04[2], at 16-46 to 16-47 (1989)
(concluding that oil division orders logically could be considered sales of goods subject to
UCC). Whether the duties imposed by the UCC would differ substantially from those
imposed by the covenants implied in the oil and gas lease would be an issue for the courts
to decide.
304. A. W. Walker, Jr., Fee Simple Ownership of Oil and Gas in Texas, 6 TEX. L. REV.
125, 125-26 (1928). In examining this era of oil and gas jurisprudence, Professor Walker
explained the confusion created by early cases:
[T]here is in the process of evolution today a distinct body of rules of law which may
properly be designated the law of oil and gas ....
As a result of this changing viewpoint many of the early decisions on the subject in this state, which have never been
expressly overruled, are, by reason of the effect of recent decisions, no longer authoritative, and serve but to mislead those unfamiliar with the progress of this branch of the
law. And indeed, in some instance, these early cases have seemingly confused our
present courts, or else there has been a failure to properly appreciate the far-reaching
effect of the principles enunciated in recent Supreme Court decisions, with the result
that our reports today contain a heterogeneous mass of cases many of which are obviously conflicting and extremely confusing to the searcher after the law.
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courts were asked to determine whether, for taxation purposes, the
interests created in oil and gas leases should be treated as realty or
personalty. For example, in Hager v. Stakes, °5 the Supreme Court
of Texas concluded that the in-kind oil royalty provision effectively
excepted title from the lessee to the stated fractional share of the
oil in the lessor.3 °6 The lessor's retention of title to this portion of
the oil caused the court to conclude that this retained portion was
taxable against the lessor as real property. 0 7
In reaching this conclusion based on the "retained ownership"
view, the Hager court had to distinguish an earlier case, Stephens
County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co. 30 8 Stephens County is known
for establishing the principle that the oil and gas lease vests the
lessee with a fee simple determinable interest in 8/8ths of the oil
and gas in place, leaving in the lessor a possibility of reverter and
the right to receive its profit from the exploitation of the land by
the lessee.30 9 In Hager the court recognized that the Stephens
County view of the royalty, as the right to receive a profit, might
require labeling the lessor's royalty as personalty rather than realty. 310 Therefore, the Hager court distinguished the earlier case of
Stephens County and stressed that the lease language in Stephens
County provided the lessee with the option to pay in-kind or in
cash. 311 Because, in contrast, the in-kind provision in the Hager
leases was at the option of the lessor, the court concluded that the
lessor had retained title to the oil, which created a real property
interest in the lessor.31 2
In his early influential writings about the nature of estates created by the oil and gas lease, Professor A. W. Walker questioned
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

116 Tex. 453, 294 S.W. 835 (1927).
Hager, 294 S.W. at 840.
Id. at 842.
113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923).
Stephens County, 254 S.W. at 292. See, e.g., RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW
OF OIL AND GAS § 1.3, at 30-31 (2d ed. 1991); 1 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J.
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 203.3, at 44 (1995); 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE
LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 2.2, at 27-30 (1996). Not all jurisdictions
view the oil and gas lease as creating a fee simple determinable in the lessee. In fact, Texas
is only one of about three jurisdictions adopting that view. RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY,
THE LAW OF OIL & GAS § 6.1, at 259 n.32 (3d ed. 1991).
310. Hager, 294 S.W. at 839-40.
311. Id. at 840.
312. Id. at 841.
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the distinction made in the Hager case.3 13 He illustrated that the
Hager approach would require a case-by-case reading of oil royalty

clauses: leases that provided lessees with an option between an inkind or cash royalty payment would pass all title to the lessee,
while those with an in-kind option resting with the lessor would
pass title to only 7/8ths of the oil to the lessee.

4

Under this logic,

only in the
latter situation would the lessor's royalty be considered
5
realty. 31
In order to avoid the inconsistencies rendered inevitable with
this case-by-case approach, Professor Walker suggested that policy
required viewing all oil and gas royalties as realty, regardless of

variations in the oil royalty clause.316 Otherwise, as he demonstrated, the oil and gas industry would be hindered in the application of other real property principles, including the dictates of the

recording statutes and the Rule Against Perpetuities. 17 To accomplish this policy goal and to avoid conflicting case-by-case decisions, he suggested viewing the lessor's oil royalty, regardless of
whether the lessee had the option to pay that royalty in kind, as
unaccrued rents. 318 Under this approach, the lessor's royalty would

be classified as real property because common law principles consider unaccrued rents as real property.319
In a case decided after Professor Walker had published his views,

the Supreme Court of Texas disapproved of language in the Hager
decision. In Sheffield v. Hogg,2 ° the supreme court expressly

313. A. W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas
Lease in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 1, 34 (1928).
314. Id. This example assumes that the lease called for the usual 1/8th royalty.
315. Id.
316. See id. at 37 (demonstrating why it is "highly desirable" to consider all royalty
interests as land interests).
317. Id. at 13, 38. In Kansas, for example, nonparticipating royalty interests are void
under the Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP) because that state has not viewed those interests as vested real property interests. See Cosgrove v. Young, 642 P.2d 75, 83-84 (Kan.
1982). In Cosgrove, the court held that an instrument executed in 1918 created an interest
in royalties from future leases and, as such, was subject to RAP. Id. The court concluded
that because the interest might not vest within the RAP period, the interest was void. Id.
See generally Laura H. Burney, A PragmaticApproach to Decision Making in the Next Era
of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 47-48
(1996) (criticizing court's approach in Cosgrove).
318. A. W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas
Lease in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 1, 40 (1928).
319. Id.
320. 124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W.2d 1021 (1934).
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pointed to the need to ensure stability in the oil and gas industry,
quoting Professor Walker's conclusion that "problems and compli-

cations and the resulting confusion of land titles can be avoided by
a holding that all royalties... regardless of the method of payment,
are interests in land."' 321 After Sheffield, some commentators have
concluded that it should be considered well-settled in Texas that

the oil and gas lease vests 8/8ths of the oil and gas in the lessee, not
7/8ths, with the lessor retaining a possibility of reverter in 8/8ths.322
In fact, recent Supreme Court of Texas cases have embraced this
32 3
view of the estates created by an oil and gas lease.
In addition to questioning the analysis of the tax cases as a matter of policy, Professor Walker questioned their approach to document interpretation.324 Under the language used in most leases,
the in-kind provision in the oil royalty clause arguably should not
321. Hogg, 80 S.W.2d at 1026. The Sheffield court's approach represents a pragmatic,
yet effective, approach to the taxation issue, an approach I have advocated elsewhere. See
Laura H. Burney, A PragmaticApproach to Decision Making in the Next Era of Oil and
Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1 passim (1996).
322. RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL & GAS § 2.5, at 59 n.94 (3d ed.
1991). The prevailing view is that the royalty payment is real property, although payable in
money, and the oil and gas lease is viewed as placing the entire mineral estate in the lessee.
See State v. Quintana Petroleum, 134 Tex. 179, 186-87, 133 S.W.2d 112, 115 (1939) (concluding that interests reserved in mineral leases or conveyed from leasehold estates are
realty). In an earlier article, I criticized the tax cases for creating an "estate misconception" about the estates created by an oil and gas lease. Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable
Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine in Texas Deed Construction, 34 S.TEX. L. REV. 73,
88-89 (1993). Under the "estate misconception," a lessor/grantor considers that she has
retained title to 1/8th of the oil and the gas because of the royalty clause. Id. That misconception leads to problems in conveyancing. Because lessors consider that they own 1/8th
of the oil and gas after leasing their lands, they insert the wrong fraction in mineral deeds.
Id. For example, a lessor intending to convey 1/2 of her interest would use the fraction 1/
16, assuming she should multiply 1/2 times her 1/8th royalty. Id. at 89. The result has been
numerous deeds with conflicting fractions. Id. At least one jurisdiction has expressly incorporated the effects of the estate misconception into its interpretative approach. See
Heyen v. Hartnett, 679 P.2d 1152, 1158 (Kan. 1984). However, the Kansas Supreme Court
considered the estate misconception only after ruling that the deed was ambiguous. Recently, the Supreme Court of Texas held that a deed with the conflicting fractions 1/12 and
1/96 unambiguously conveyed a 1/12 mineral interest. In reaching that conclusion, the
court considered the estate misconception "instructive" but not "dispositive." Concord Oil
Co. v. Pennzoil Prod. Co., 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 33, 40 (Oct. 18, 1996).
323. "When the lessor owns all the mineral estate (8/8) and executes an oil and gas
lease, the lessor has conveyed all the mineral estate (8/8) but has retained a possibility of
reverter in the entire mineral estate." Concord Oil Co., 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.at 39; see Luckel
v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991) (viewing lease as conveying 8/8ths to lessee).
324. A. W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas
Lease in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 1, 40 (1928). Specifically, Professor Walker questioned:
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be considered a reservation at all.325 Indeed, the granting clause of

an oil and gas lease purports to convey all of the oil and gas to the
lessee. 26 Moreover, traditional rules governing the interpretation

of documents require that reservations must be unequivocally

stated,327 which precludes finding reservations by implication.32 8 In

light of these interpretative rules, courts should not view the inkind royalty option as a reservation of title to the oil, but instead,
as establishing a payment method for the consideration referred to
in the granting clause, the royalty. 329 Unlike the "retained ownership" view, such an interpretation is more compatible with rules of

And, assuming the correctness of the proposition announced in that decision that the
reservation of royalties payable in kind, as expressed in an ordinary type of oil and gas
lease, denotes an intention to except title to the royalty oil from the grant, about
which the writer confesses considerable doubt, does it necessarily follow, because title
to the entire eight-eights of all minerals upon which the royalties are payable in money
are regarded as passing to the lessee, that the unaccrued royalties that are payable in
money are personalty?
Id.
325. Id. at 40-41. But see 3 EUGENE 0. KuNrz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL
AND GAS LAW § 39.2(b), at 285 (1989) (writing, "[tlhe effect of providing for delivery of
royalty oil in kind is to retain title to such oil in the lessor.").
326. A. W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of the PropertyInterests Created by an Oil and Gas
Lease in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1928); see also Stephens County, 113 Tex. at 168, 254
S.W. at 292 (recognizing lease as conveying all oil and gas in place).
327. There is a presumption that a conveyance passes to the grantee all of the estate
owned by the grantor, unless there are clear words to the contrary. See, e.g., Waters v.
Ellis, 158 Tex. 342, 347, 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1958); Cockrell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
157 Tex. 10, 15, 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (1956); Brown v. Davila, 807 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ). Because a conveyance is construed against the grantor to pass the greatest estate possible, any reservation of interest must be clearly and
plainly stated. See Graham v. Kuzmich, 876 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1994, no writ); see also Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral
Deeds and Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1,
117-24 (1993) (reviewing application of "greatest estate canon").
328. Courts will not allow a grantor to assert a reservation by implication when the
mineral estate is not expressly reserved. Chambers v. Huggins, 709 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ) (stating that "a reservation of minerals must be
made by clear language and courts do not favor reservation by implication"). See generally
RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.2, at 123-28 (3d ed. 1991);
Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 117-23 (1993).
329. The lessor's royalty is generally referred to as part of the consideration for the
lease. RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 8.1, at 446 (3d ed. 1991)
(explaining that "[tihe primary interest and consideration of the lessor is in the royalty
payments to be returned from production.").
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document interpretation and it avoids the unpredictability inherent
in a case-by-case approach.33 °

Just as the rules for document interpretation fail to support the
"retained ownership" view of the oil royalty clause, precedent provides little reason to adopt that view. While cases explicitly have

applied the "retained ownership" view of the oil royalty clause in
resolving taxation issues, Texas cases have not expressly embraced

that view as a basis for determining the effect of oil division orders

on the lessee's royalty obligation. 331 For example, in the Williams
and Cook cases discussed earlier in Part III, the lessees argued that
lessor/third-party purchaser division orders were contracts for the
A typical granting clause reads as follows:
1. Lessor, in consideration of the sum of __
Dollars ($
), in
hand paid, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the royalties herein provided,
does hereby grant....
AAPL Form 675 Oil and Gas Lease, in EUGENE 0. KUNTZ ET AL., FORMS MANUAL TO
ACCOMPANY CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 12 (2d ed. 1993). A recent
Texas case apparently has adopted this view of the oil royalty. See Concord Oil Co., 40
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 39 (stating, "[w]hen the lessor owns all the mineral estate (8/8) and
executes an oil and gas lease, the lessor has conveyed all the mineral estate (8/8) but has
retained a possibility of reverter in the entire mineral estate.").
330. Early Texas cases rejected a case-by-case approach to interpreting the granting
clause. According to Professor Walker, from 1915 to 1923, "courts ... determine[d] the
nature of the lessee's property interest by an examination of the wording of the granting
clause in each particular lease." A. W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of the Property Interests
Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (1928). In a subsequent
period, which began with Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254
S.W. 290 (1923), this case-by-case approach to the granting clause was rejected. Id. at 7.
According to Professor Walker, the Supreme Court of Texas in Stephens held "that the
ordinary variations in the wording of granting clauses in oil and gas leases are purely superficial and that the parties actually contemplate the creation of the same property interest
despite these differences in phraseology." Id. at 7-8.
331. See Richard F. Brown, Texas Division Orders and the Texas Division Order Statute, THE LANDMAN, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 26 (recognizing retained ownership theory has not
been adopted by division order cases). For example, in an early oil case, the court stressed
estoppel in articulating a pre-Middleton binding-until-revoked rule. Hogg v. Magnolia Petroleum, 267 S.W. 482, 484 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, judgm't adopted). A later gas division order case relied on Hogg without noting conceptual differences between gas and oil
division orders. Chicago Corp. v. Wall, 150 Tex. 217, 222-23, 293 S.W.2d 844, 847 (1956).
Admittedly, several commentators and treatises have repeated the retained ownership
mantra. See 3 EUGENE 0. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 39.2(b), at
285-86 (1989) (noting royalty clause that provides for delivery of royalty oil in kind retains
title in lessor and permits lessor to recover on breach of contract theory); Stuart C. Holliman, A Basic Overview of Division Orders, in STATE BAR OF TEX., PROF'L DEV. PROGRAM, OIL AND GAS LAW: FOR LEGAL ASSISTANTS AND ATTORNEYS C, C-21 (1984);
EUGENE 0. KUNTZ ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 249 (2d ed.
1993).
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sale of the lessors' oil. 332 As explained above, that argument stems
from the notion that oil division orders should be treated as different from gas division orders because of the in-kind provision in the
oil royalty clauses. In both cases, however, the courts implicitly
rejected that notion by recognizing that the division order did not
supplant the express or implied lease obligations.33 3 Significantly,

the Texas division order statute has codified the Williams/Cook
view of the oil division order, rather than a contract approach
based on the "retained ownership" theory.334
In the ongoing "posted price" litigation, courts should heed the
words of Professor Walker before designating oil division orders as
contracts for the sale of goods based on the "retained ownership"
view of the oil royalty clause. As he demonstrated, the cases supply a questionable basis for adopting the "retained ownership"
view. Unfortunately, these cases represent a phenomenon common in oil and gas jurisprudence. Rather than striving to adopt

overriding principles for oil and gas law to ensure doctrinal consistency and predictability, the early courts created rules in a random
332. Cook, 713 S.W.2d at 420; Williams, 767 S.W.2d at 195. In Williams the lessees, as
appellees, argued that "pursuant to the terms of each division order appellants' royalty oil
was sold only to [the purchaser] and not to any appellee, and under the division order each
appellant looked solely to [the purchaser] for payment for the oil sold." Williams, 767
S.W.2d at 195.
333. In fact, the Williams court expressly applied gas division order case law, namely
the Middleton and Cabot cases. However, the court determined that those cases did not
require exempting the lessee from liability when the third-party purchaser failed to pay
royalties. Williams, 767 S.W.2d at 195-96.
334. See discussion supra Part III.E.2; see also Ernest E. Smith, The New Division
Order: Legal and PracticalAspects, 42 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. (forthcoming 1997)
(noting that division order is not contract but affirmation of interest). The statute treats oil
and gas division orders the same. Specifically, the definition of a division order in the
statute provides that the term means "an agreement signed by the payee directing the
distribution of proceeds from the sale of oil, gas, casinghead gas, or other related hydrocarbons." TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.401(3) (Vernon 1993). The definition of a
"payor" in the statute includes division orders signed both between lessors and lessees, and
lessors and third-party purchasers. Id. § 91.401(2). "Payor" means the party "who undertakes to distribute oil and gas proceeds to the payee, whether as the purchaser of the
production of oil or gas.., or as operator.., or as lessee." Id. The only distinction made
in the statute between oil and gas is that the statute provides an optional form for oil only.
Id. § 91.402(d). However, the National Association of Division Order analysts have
promulgated a model form for oil and gas. NADOA Model Form Division Order, 21
NADOA NEWSLETI'ER (Nat'l Ass'n of Division Order Analysts, Dallas, Tex.), July 1995, at
3 (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal). For an excellent discussion of the NADOA
form, see Ernest E. Smith, The New Division Order: Legal and PracticalAspects, 42
RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997).
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fashion, as they responded to narrow issues for which the common

law provided few direct answers.335 In light of this ad hoc approach, the taxation cases provide weak precedent for adopting the
"retained ownership" view of the oil royalty clause as guiding doc-

trine for resolving division-order disputes. Moreover, recent cases
of the Supreme Court of Texas have implicitly rejected the "retained ownership" view of the estates created by an oil and gas
lease.336

In scrutinizing the taxation cases, courts should also recognize
that those cases invoked the "retained ownership" view of the oil
royalty clause, in a limited context, in order to accomplish worthy
policy goals. Courts also should consider the competing policies of
the lessors and lessees in the context of "posted price" disputes.

Regardless of the in-kind option for oil, lessors generally rely on
the lessees to market both the oil and gas as provided in the
lease. 337 As evidenced even in the Middleton decision, courts have
recognized the need to prevent lessees from using the division order to detract from the lessor's express and implied rights as estab335. Laura H. Burney, A PragmaticApproach to Decision Making in the Next Era of
Oil and Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 9-12, 19
(1996); see RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 1.3, at 26-34 (3d ed.
1991).
336. See, e.g., Concord Oil Co., 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 39; Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 461.
337. See EUGENE 0. KuNTz ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW
248 n.33 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that "[liessors rarely take royalty oil in kind"); see also Wolfe
v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425, 432 (10th Cir. 1936) (recognizing that lessee can act as agent for
lessor in marketing oil but implied covenant is still applicable). The logic of the Wolfe case
is questionable. The oil royalty clause provided that the lessee would "deliver to the credit
of lessor, free of costs, in the pipe line to which he may connect his wells, the equal oneeighth part of oil produced." Id. at 427. However, the lessor made no arrangements to
store or market the oil. Id. In order to justify the lessee's action in marketing the oil to a
purchaser, the court viewed the lessee as the lessor's agent. Id. at 432-33. If that relationship applies, then the law of agency, rather than the standards imposed by covenants implied in the lease, would govern the analysis of the lessee's actions. The distinction is
significant because, while agency rules can create a fiduciary relationship between agent
and principal, courts have resisted that heightened duty as between lessors and lessees. See
David E. Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 445, 479 (1987) (noting
implications of finding agency relationship between lessor and lessee). Yet the Wolfe court
concluded that the lessee had fulfilled its implied covenant of marketing. Wolfe, 83 F.2d at
434. This conclusion is significant because it suggests the court also determined that the
implied covenant of marketing applies to oil, despite the in-kind provision of the oil royalty
clause, quoted above. See id. at 432 (quoting scholars regarding implied covenant to market). Therefore, the Wolfe case could represent a rejection of the "retained ownership"
view of the oil royalty clause.
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lished in the lease royalty clause. To the extent that the cases
spawned by gas royalty controversies have respected that policy,
those cases should be equally applicable to cases determining the
effect of oil division orders on the lessee's oil royalty obligation. 38

Ultimately, if courts reject the "retained ownership" view of the
oil royalty clause, they would simplify division-order jurisprudence
in two respects. First, rejecting the "retained ownership" view obviates the need to create case law for oil division orders separate
338. There will obviously be countless questions for the courts to resolve as they begin
to apply these cases to the facts raised in the "posted price" litigation. For example, if the
plaintiffs need to avoid the binding-until-revoked rule with the Gavenda exception, the
unjust-enrichment criterion must be satisfied. In that regard, the plaintiffs may have to
show that the lessees benefited because the affiliate transactions used in marketing the oil
were shams designed to benefit the lessees by allowing them to calculate royalty on a basis
lower than the amount they actually received for the oil. That same evidence will be relevant in supporting that plaintiffs' implied covenant claims. See Parker v. TXO Prod. Corp.,
716 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ). But first, courts must
decide whether the implied covenant applies to a "posted price" provision. If that term is
treated as synonymous with market value, some commentators consider the implied covenant to be irrelevant. See Thomas A. Harrell, Recent Developments in Nonregulatory Oil
and Gas Law, 31 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 327, 328-29 (1980); Bruce M. Kramer &
Chris Pearson, The Implied Marketing Covenant in Oil and Gas Leases: Some Needed
Changes for the 80's, 46 LA. L. REv. 787, 815 n.166 (1986). But see Jacqueline Lang
Weaver, When Express Clauses Bar Implied Covenants, Especially in Natural Gas Marketing Scenarios, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 14, on file with the
St. Mary's Law Journal) (noting that neither Vela nor Middleton held that market value
royalty clause barred implied covenant to market). If the covenant does not apply, then
comparable sales should be used to determine the appropriate valuation basis. Yet even
that standard involves scrutinizing sales to affiliates. See 3 EUGENE 0. Kuwrz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 40.4, at 332 (1989) (recognizing that "[i]f ... the
lessee is a corporate affiliate of the purchaser and the sale is not at an arm's length, the sale
will not be accepted as representing the market price or market value."). The lower court
in Middleton recognized that if such sales were not legitimate arm's length transactions,
they could not be counted as comparable sales. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d
349, 358 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] 1978), rev'd in part, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). In
disagreeing with Exxon's argument that the trial court erred in refusing to consider sales to
affiliates, the court stated:
It would be manifestly unjust for a lessee to sell gas to a subsidiary or to an affiliated
firm, person or corporation for a low price and allow that company to extract a larger
price in the resale of such product. To allow a lessee to pay royalty out of a shallow
pocket while receiving proceeds in a deep pocket would be intolerable.
Id.
As discussed earlier, when the state serves as lessor there are extensive statutory
schemes in place that govern. The statute specifically provides that if a transaction is not
an arm's length transaction, it will not be a comparable sale needed to determine market
value. See 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 9.7(b)(1)(E)(ii) (Vernon 1996) (stating, "[i]f a contract
is not negotiated at arm's length, or was between affiliated parties, the presumption that
market value is equal to gross proceeds shall not apply.").
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from case law already developed for gas division orders. Second,
avoiding separate treatment of oil and gas division orders would
create consistency with the Texas division-order statutory provisions which treat post-1991 oil and gas division orders the same.
That consistency is significant because eventually those statutory
provisions, rather than case law, will govern disputes regarding the
effect of oil and gas division orders on the royalty obligation.
B.

The Vela Scenario in Reverse

Just as market changes for oil have fueled the "posted price"
litigation, the restructuring of traditional gas markets has led to a
variety of new disputes concerning the gas royalty obligation.339
For instance, lessees who have been paying royalties pursuant to
division orders that contain an "amount realized" standard now
would prefer to pay royalties on the "market value royalty" standard, as set forth in the lease. 34 0 The "market value royalty" standard, in today's deregulated gas market, is potentially lower than
the amount the lessees are realizing from their gas sales contracts
with third-party purchasers. Therefore, in order to take advantage
of the more favorable lease language, lessees have seized upon
Middleton's binding-until-revoked rule.341 Ironically, lessees also
are now championing the Vela opinion's "plain meaning" interpre339. See John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation,49 SMU L. REV. 223, 223-26
(1996) (describing recent changes in natural gas market structure and their effect on natural gas business). One of the new disputes concerning the gas royalty obligation involves
determining which marketing charges are deductible. See id. at 228 (recognizing new royalty obligation disputes over issues including "incentive payments to the lessee, (e.g., gas
inventory charges, reservation fees, supply bonuses) upon production payments to the
lessee or upon profits from investment devices such as hedges, trades, or swaps"). See
generally Owen L. Anderson, The Gas Royalty Obligation: Is Royalty Ordinarily Payable
on the "Raw" Gas at the Mouth of the Well or on "Marketable" Gas?, 37 NAT. RESOURCES
J. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
340. Michael P. Irvin, The Implied Covenant to Market in the DeregulatedNatural Gas
Industry, 42 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997) (recognizing that in today's
market, where lessees are selling gas at price greater than market value, lessees would
rather base royalty payments on lower market value price). See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp.
v. De Los Santos, No. 94-12219 (193d Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex., Nov. 23, 1994), for an
example of a Vela case in reverse.
341. See Michael P. Irvin, The Implied Covenant to Market in the DeregulatedNatural
Gas Industry, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on file with
the St. Mary's Law Journal);Carroll Martin & Jane Webre, Gas Royalty Issues: Who, What,
How and When? Valuation and Payment in Today's Market, 46 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N § 2.05[1], at 2-10 (1995).
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tation of the "market value royalty" standard, an interpretation
they loathed when gas prices peaked in the 1970s.
Now that market conditions may have reversed the positions of
lessees and lessors, regarding both the interpretation of the "market value royalty" standard and the effect of division orders on the

royalty obligation, appellate courts may be asked to reevaluate the
Middleton and Vela decisions. This "reverse Vela" scenario raises

the following questions. First, can lessees revoke division orders
under Middleton, although that case formulated the binding-untilrevoked rule in response to a lessor's attempt to avoid the payment
provisions in division orders? Second, can a lessee calculate royal-

ties on the "market value royalty" standard even if that standard is
lower than the amount actually realized by lessees from gas sales
contracts? As explained below, courts are likely to answer both

questions in the affirmative.
1. Application of the Binding-Until-Revoked Rule
For lessees, an initial step toward taking advantage of prevailing
market-value prices, which could be lower than their contract
prices, is to revoke division orders containing "amount realized"
standards for calculating royalties. 342 Although Middleton clearly
held that a lessor could revoke a disadvantageous division order, it

took a later case to clarify that the binding-until-revoked rule applies for lessees as well. In Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley,343 Sun Oil's

division orders provided for royalty payments that exceeded the
342. For division orders signed after August 26, 1991, the statutory provisions regarding revocation will apply. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402(g) (Vernon 1993).
However, for division orders signed before August 26, 1991, Middleton's methods for revoking will apply. See supra note 64 (describing how to revoke division order according to
Middleton); see also Stuart C. Holliman, A Basic Overview of Division Orders (discussing
methods for revoking division orders), in STATE BAR OF TEX., PROF'L DEV. PROGRAM,
OIL AND GAS LAW: FOR LEGAL ASSISTANTS AND ATrORNEYS C, C-7 (1984). Moreover,
it should be noted that both the statutory provision and the Middleton opinion provide that
division orders are binding only "to the extent that they have been acted on and made the
basis of settlements and payments." TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402(g) (Vernon
1993); Middleton, 613 S.W.2d at 250 (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Williams, 158 F.2d
723, 727 (5th Cir. 1946)). Therefore, a lessee who begins making payments according to
the lease clause, without having formally revoked the division order, could argue that the
"amount realized" standard in the division order is not "binding" because it has not been
"acted on." See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. De Los Santos, No. 94-12219 (193d Dist. Ct.,
Dallas County, Tex., Nov. 23, 1994).
343. 626 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1981).
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requirements of the lease. 3" That error stemmed from Sun's mis5

Soon

orders. 3 6

In an

taken interpretation of a net-profits clause in the lease.

after realizing its error, Sun revoked the division

effort to force Sun to continue calculating its royalties as set forth

in the division orders, the lessors asserted estoppel, ratification and

waiver.347 Relying on Middleton, the court rejected the lessors' argument and held that Sun could make royalty payments based
upon the lease clause, once the division orders were revoked.348

Madeley, therefore, provides initial support for the lessees' case in
the "reverse Vela" scenario.

2. Application of the "Market Value Royalty" Standard
Just as Madeley affirms the lessee's right to revoke a division order, the Middleton and Vela opinions support the lessee's right then
to pay royalties according to the "market value royalty" standard

in the lease, even if that amount is less than the amount the lessee
actually receives from its oil or gas sales contracts. The Vela and
Middleton courts applied a "plain meaning" approach to the term
"market value" in the gas royalty clause. 349 Both courts treated the
lease royalty clause and the lessee's gas sales contract as totally
independent of each other and held that market value was to be
determined on the day of production.3 5 0 The effect of those judicial holdings was to require the lessee to assume all of the financial
risks in contracting to sell the gas. 1

Having assumed these financial risks when gas prices rose, it is
logical for the lessees now to enjoy the benefits bestowed by de344. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d at 727.
345. Id. The lease contained, in addition to a 1/8th royalty provision, a reservation to
the lessors of 1/2 of the net profits from the 7/8ths working interest. Id. For several years,
the lessee had paid the lessors net profits on both oil and natural gas production. Id
Later, the lessee determined that the net profits interest applied only to oil. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 734.
348. Id. Sun Oil, however, did not seek reimbursement for past overpayments.
349. See John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation,49 SMU L. REv. 223, 223-24
(1996) (recognizing that Vela and Middleton represent majority view by plainly interpreting
"market value" as "the price a willing buyer and seller would agree upon at the time of
production").
350. Exxon v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Tex. 1981); Texas Oil & Gas Corp.
v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 871 (Tex. 1968).
351. See David E. Pierce, Royalty Calculation in a Restructured Gas Market, 13 E.
MIN. L. FOUND. § 18.03[b], at 18-28 (1992).
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creased market values. 352 Thus, absent lease language expressly
prohibiting a lessee from calculating royalties based on amounts
that are lower than the amounts the lessee actually received, les-

sees should be successful in capitalizing on decreased market values in a reverse Vela scenario.353
3. Application of the Texas Division-Order Statute
In determining the relative rights of lessees and lessors in a "reverse Vela" scenario, the statute applies to division orders executed
after 1991. And the statutory provisions likely will lead to the
same conclusions reached under the foregoing case law analysis.

Regarding application of the binding-until-revoked rule, the first

question raised above, section 91.402(g) 354 reflects the Madeley position that division orders are revokable by both lessees and les352. See id.(reasoning that "in a gas market of de-escalating prices, the lessee should
be able to reap the full benefit of its contract risk assumption").
353. Accord Michael P. Irvin, The Implied Covenant to Market in the DeregulatedNatural Gas Industry, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 64, on

file with the St. Mary's Law Journal) (contending that, in absence of express stipulation
stating otherwise, market value royalty clause should be interpreted literally). Federal regulations have already addressed the problem for lessors in the reverse Vela scenario. See
30 C.F.R §§ 206.152(h), 206.153(h) (1995). That legislation provides that in no event may a
lessee calculate royalties on a basis lower than what the lessee receives. Id.; see also
Michael P. Irvin, The Implied Covenant to Market in the DeregulatedNatural Gas Industry,
42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 64 n.207, on file with the
St. Mary's Law Journal).
In jurisdictions that have adopted the cooperative venture approach, rather than the
plain meaning approach, lessors might be successful in arguing that the implied covenant of
marketing requires the lessee to calculate royalties on the higher price, whether it be the
market value or the lessee's sales contract. Michael P. Irvin, The Implied Covenant to
Market in the DeregulatedNatural Gas Industry, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 64-65, on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal). But see Craig R.
Carver, Natural Gas Price Indices: Do They Provide a Sound Basis for Sales and Royalty
Payments?, 42 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 51-52, on file
with the St. Mary's Law Journal) (considering that Tara jurisdictions might allow market
value payments that are lower than amounts realized). In a plain terms jurisdiction like
Texas, however, some commentators would conclude that the implied covenant of marketing should not provide a means to the lessee's end on this issue. They reason that the
covenant is irrelevant when the "market value royalty" lease standard applies because that
standard is a fact question requiring objective opinion evidence. Bruce M. Kramer & Chris
Pearson, The Implied Marketing Covenant in Oil and Gas Leases: Some Needed Changes
for the 80's, 46 LA. L. REV. 787, 815 n.166 (1986); see supra note 344. Professor Jacqueline
Weaver, however, argues that Middleton and Vela did not foreclose application of the implied covenant of marketing to a "market value royalty" standard. See supra note 338.
354. TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.§ 91.402(g) (Vernon 1993). The statutory provision
reads as follows:
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sors. In answering the second question, the lessors will long for an
express statutory provision prohibiting lessees from calculating
their royalty based on amounts that are lower than the proceeds
the lessee receives from its sales contract. The statute, however,
contains no such provision. In making such an argument, a lessor
might point to section 91.402(i), which states that "the terms 'market value' . . . or other such language ... shall be defined as the
amount realized. ' 355 But as explained earlier in Part III, under
rules of statutory interpretation, that section 91.402(i) only should
permit using a division order to replace the lease's "market value
royalty" standard with an "amount realized" standard; it should
not be interpreted to create a rule that universally equates the definitions of those two standards in oil and gas leases.356 Although
lessors obviously would prefer such a rule for the "reverse Vela"
scenario, that rule should not apply without lease revisions or future statutory changes.
V.

CONCLUSION

In developing division order doctrine, both the courts and the
legislature have struggled with the competing policies of producers
and royalty owners. In the courts, producers seeking protection
from liability and efficiency in the payment process championed
the binding-until-revoked rule, as established in Middleton and expanded in Cabot, for defining their royalty obligation. Royalty
owners, on the other hand, loathed the use of the division order to
detract from their rights as established in the lease royalty clause.
Those owners praised cases such as Gavenda, Pyote, and Williams
for providing the protection they deemed warranted by their inferior bargaining position. Ultimately, under case law and the division-order statute, both royalty owners and producers endured
deletions from their doctrinal "wish lists."
Division orders are binding for the time and to the extent that they have been acted
on and made the basis of settlements and payments, and, from the time that notice is
given that settlements will not be made on the basis provided in them, they cease to be
binding. Division orders are terminable by either party on 30 days written notice.
Id. (emphasis added).
355. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE AN. § 91.402(i) (Vernon 1993); see supra Part III.B. for a
discussion of § 91.402(i).
356. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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Although the Texas division-order statute includes several provisions that require careful study, its terms can be harmonized to articulate a workable set of rules that fairly give and take from the
wish lists of interest owners, producers, and purchasers. For example, the statute answers the perennial question of whether royalty
owners must sign a division order before receiving payments. By
endorsing that condition in a limited context, the statute simultaneously permits purchasers to proceed efficiently with the payment
process, and assures lessors that their rights under their leases will
not be diminished.
Whether that assurance to lessors is genuine, however, depends
upon the particular issue involved. For example, the statute in effect permits the lessee to amend a lease calling for a "market value
royalty" standard by allowing the lessee to "clarify" that the actual
definition of "market value" is the "amount realized. '357 On the
other hand, the division order does not provide a certain shield for
the lessee against liability for breach of implied covenants. Nor
does the statute permit the lessee to allocate post-production costs
358
to the lessor if the lease clearly prohibits deducting those CoStS.
Yet, a nonparticipating royalty owner in a Gavenda situation may
find that the binding-until-revoked rule prohibits recovery for past
underpayment of royalty, without exception.
Division-order disputes are destined to confront Texas courts in
the decades to come. The awkward wording and internal inconsistencies of the current division-order statute will spawn
litigation over its meaning and effect. Also, for division
orders executed before 1991, because existing case law applies,
questions about the interpretations of those cases will persist
as a source of dispute. Moreover, market changes have led
to new controversies over the royalty obligation. These new
disputes, particularly the "posted prices '359 and "reverse

357. In the restructured gas market of the 90s and beyond, lessees likely won't have
the motivation to "clarify" leases in this manner. As noted previously in Part IV.B., today
the market value or spot market prices may be lower than the contract price.
358. The trick, as evidenced in Heritage Resources, is drafting language that a court
will interpret as expressing that intent.
359. Texas Gen. Land Office v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 95-08680 (345th Dist. Ct.,
Travis County, Tex., Nov. 22, 1995). For an article discussing the factors that led Land
Commissioner Garry Mauro to sue several major oil companies for underpayment of royalties, see Jim Henderson, Oil Bust, TEX. Bus., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 28.
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Vela ''360 disputes, have already resulted in widespread litigation.
Additionally, in the prevailing market in which the lessee's marketing function has become more diverse and expensive, the issue of
allocating post-production costs will continue to arise. Resolving
all of these controversies will require courts, and most likely the
legislature, to revisit division-order case law and statutory provisions and to reconsider the competing policies of royalty owners
and oil and gas producers.

360. David E. Pierce, Royalty Calculationin a Restructured Gas Market, 16 E. MIN. L.
§ 18.03, at 18-19 (1992); Michael P. Irvin, The Implied Covenant to Market in the
DeregulatedNatural Gas Industry, 42 Roclcy MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 60-61, on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal); see discussion supra Part IV.C.
FoUND.

